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Abstract: This paper examines the impact of democratisation on tax structure in an agrarian economy 
where goods can be produced at home for self-consumption. We first develop a model of optimal 
taxation with heterogeneous agents where the good produced in the market is subject to a consumption 
tax, whereas the homogeneous good produced at home is burdened by a direct tax (such as land tithes). 
Contrary to conventional theory, our model suggests that extension of the voting franchise to poorer 
segments of the population exerts a negative impact on the share of direct to indirect taxes. Using 
unique national and regional tax data for the Kingdom of Greece - a typical agrarian economy when 
universal male suffrage was established in 1864 - we provide consistent empirical evidence. Greek 
governments adjusted tax policy in order to meet the preferences of the newly enfranchised electorate 
that constituted mostly by peasants and farmers. This group was harmed substantially by direct taxes 
on land but was able to avoid indirect taxes through self-consumption. We also employ a sample of 
12 European countries over the same period and provide evidence for a similar change in the tax 
structure when the agricultural sector dominates the economy. 
 
 
JEL3+Ǿ; Keywords: democracy, tax structure, fiscal capacity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgments: We are grateful to George Dertilis for helping us with the data as well as for many useful 
comments and suggestions. We thank Gerasimos Notaras and the Historical Archives of National Bank of 
Greece for providing access to the Fiscal Accounts of the Greek State. We have benefited from comments and 
suggestions by Toke Aidt, Stelios Arvanitis, Gerda Asmus, Manthos Delis, George Economides, Andreas 
Irmen, Christos Kotsogiannis, Anastasia Litina, Petros Milionis, Alberto Montagnoli, Nikos Mylonidis, Antonio 
Navas, Panu Poutvaara, Costas Roumanias, Argyris Sakalis, Karl Taylor, and Eugenia Vella. This work has 
also benefited from comments received by seminar/conference participants at the University of Sheffield, CREA 
Workshop on Culture, and Comparative Development, the 2017 Economic History Society conference, the 6th 
International Ioannina Meeting on Applied Economics and Finance, the 2019 conference on Applied Theory, 
Macro and Empirical Finance, and the 2019 European Public Choice Society conference. Any remaining errors 
are ours. A previous version of this paper was circulated under the title "Democratisation and tax structure: 
Greece versus Europe from a historical perspective". 
2 
 
1. Introduction 
Conventional theory suggests that extending the voting franchise to poorer segments of the society 
increases the demand for redistribution and fiscal expansion (see, e.g., Meltzer and Richard, 1981). 
This is attributed to competing political parties that are expected to shift their policy platforms to 
respond to the preferences of the hitherto disenfranchised voters.1 A large number of studies employing 
historical data investigate whether the so-FDOOHG³ILUVWZDYHRIdemocratisation´WKat took place from 
1828 to 1926 (Huntington, 1993), affected the level and the pattern of government spending and 
taxation (see Lindert, 1994; Lindert, 2004; Aidt et al., 2006; Aidt and Jensen, 2009a; Aidt and Jensen, 
2013).2  
Interestingly, some of these studies highlight the importance of various intermediating factors 
that make the relationship between democratisation and fiscal policy much more complex (see, e.g., 
Aidt et al., 2010; Aidt and Jensen, 2013). One significant factor seems to be the phase of economic 
development and consequently the structure of the domestic economy (see e.g., Aidt and Jensen, 
2009b). In particular, economic history suggests that industrialised economies were in need of 
increased fiscal revenues that would ensure the provision of public goods, such as health and education. 
This is due to the accumulation of physical capital during the process of industrialisation that raised 
the importance of human capital in the growth process, reflecting the complementarity between capital 
and skills.3 Since the pure laissez-faire policy failed to develop a proper educational system, citizens 
demanded from the authorities the provision of this public good (see e.g., Galor, 2005). At the same 
time, domestic migration of the working population from the countryside to the urban centres 
generated severe problems of increased urban mortality and morbidity that should have been addressed 
by investments in health-related amenities (see e.g., Szreter, 1997; Szreter and Mooney, 1998).4  
The resulted arise of public education and the subsequent increase in the literacy rate of the 
domestic population facilitated the improvement of the tax collection capacity of the state and the 
reliance on efficient direct forms of taxation (see Aidt and Jensen, 2009b).5 Therefore, when 
                                                             
1This poses the question, though, why powerful elites dilute power by offering voting rights to the poorer segments of society. Recent 
research has stressed income inequality (Justman & Gradstein, 1999; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2000; Boix, 2003) and conflicting interests 
within the elite (Lizzeri & Persico, 2004; Llavador and Oxby, 2005) as significant factors of enfranchisement in Western Europe during 
the 19th century. However, irrespective of the reason that triggered the reform, scholars share the prediction that full enfranchisement 
should increase the size of the government. For an excellent review of alternative theories of franchise extension, see Przeworski (2009). 
2
 A parallel strand of this literature investigates this relationship by focusing on the second and third waves of democratisation, employing 
modern data for a large set of developed and developing countries (see Boix, 2003; Mulligan et al., 2004; Profeta et al., 2013; Acemoglu 
et al., 2015; Kammas and Sarantides, 2018).  
3
 Evidence for the complementarity between technological progress (or capital) and skills is provided by Goldin and Katz (1998).  
4
 The standards of living issue in the era of the industrial revolution has been investigated by a large number of scholars (see e.g., 
Hobsbawm, 1957). For instance, Szreter and Mooney (1998), focusing on the largest industrial British cities, show that life expectancy 
at birth was lower in 1871 than in 1821, despite rising real wages, attributing this decline to the deteriorating urban environment. 
5
 Specifically, Aidt and Jensen (2009b) suggest that the cost of collecting income and other direct taxes relative to the cost of collecting 
indirect taxes fell as literacy and numerical skills of the potential taxpayers improve. Related to that, Besley and Persson (2011; 2013) 
show that developed countries rely to a greater extent on income taxes as opposed to indirect taxes (e.g., customs) than developing 
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democratisation takes place in the context of a developed, industrialized economy -characterized by 
high tax collection capacity- both total tax revenues (as a share of GDP) and the share of direct taxes, 
are expected to increase. However, this effect of democratisation on the size and composition of tax 
revenues might not necessarily be the case for developing economies, and even more so for a newly 
democratised agrarian economy. This is because, in such a case, the tax collection capacity of the state 
is definitely low, whereas public investment in human capital, which could help alleviate this problem 
over time, is not that urgent as in an industrialised economy.6 
 Moreover, in a less developed, agrarian economy a large number of the population is working 
in the home production sector and consumes a substantial portion of the household production. Even 
when the economy is not the typical subsistence production economy (where the production is just 
sufficient to meet the consumption of the producer), self-consumption is expected to be substantially 
high -especially in the rural areas- and the potential home production surplus is usually exchanged 
through barter, rather than a market system. The presence of a large home production sector is expected 
to affect considerably the implemented tax policy (see e.g., Kleven et al., 2000; Olovsson, 2015), and 
as a consequence the effect of voting franchise extension on the size and the composition of tax 
revenues.  
The paper at hand is the first systematic study that establishes a convincing relationship 
between democratisation and tax structure in an agrarian economy where goods to a great extent are 
produced at home for self-consumption. In particular, we focus on the remarkable political reform of 
1864 in the Kingdom of Greece that enfranchised all adult males - when it was still a typical agrarian 
economy - enabling them to vote by casting a small lead ball into a ballot box (see Figure C1 in 
Appendix C). Given that the vast majority of the population during that period was illiterate, this 
method of voting transferred real power to the people that could participate in the electoral process 
without intervention of third parties. Another exceptional characteristic of this reform is that it came 
as a result of a random and rather exogenous historical event. More precisely, it was proposed by the 
delegates of the Ionian Islands in their first participation in the National Assembly after the union of 
this region with Greece in 1864 (see, e.g., Alivizatos, 2011). 7 
                                                             
countries do. A fundamental reason is that it is much harder for developing countries to collect direct taxes, which require major 
investments in fiscal capacity, namely in enforcement and compliance structures throughout the entire economy.  
6
 Two reasons that can justify the lower level of public investment in human capital in a developing/agrarian economy are the following: 
(i) The complementarity between human capital and land is very low in the production process and definitely much lower than in the 
case of an industrialised economy (see Galor, 2005 for more details on this). On top of this, it should not be overlooked that landed elites 
do not benefit from public investment in human capital, since universal public education will increase the cost of labour beyond the 
increase in average labour productivity in the agricultural sector, reducing in this way the return of land (Galor et al., 2009); (ii) The 
priorities of a government for internal stability at this early stage of development can significantly affect the allocation of the public 
budget in favour of security expenditures and against health and education expenditures (see, Aidt et al., 2006). 
7
 In Section 3.1 we provide more details on the change of the political regime. 
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To formalise the testable empirical hypotheses in such a context, we first develop a theoretical 
model of optimal taxation with heterogeneous agents that builds upon Persson and Tabellini (2000) 
adding also the possibility these agents to work in home production. More precisely, the economy is 
populated by a continuum of agents that differ on their private productivity. Individual consumption 
is composed of a good produced and purchased in the market -and therefore is subject to a consumption 
tax- and a good that is produced by work at home and is in turn self-consumed.8 The good that is self-
consumed is not subject to the consumption tax but the level of its production is harmed by specific 
forms of direct taxation (such as the land tithes) that burden home production. Differences on private 
productivity are reflected on the optimal choices of the agents concerning the allocation of their time 
between working in the market or at home. More precisely, the higher productivity individuals are 
working in the market. Consequently, agents differ on their levels of home and market consumption 
and therefore have different preferences concerning the implemented tax policy.  
Solving the model for the median voter political equilibrium, our results are as follows.9 An 
extension of the voting rights to the poorer segments of the population -that inevitably implies lower 
levels of median productivity of the electorate- exerts a positive impact on consumption taxes and a 
negative impact on direct taxes that burden home production. As a result, democratisation causes the 
share of direct to indirect taxes to decrease. This is because the new political majority after the reform 
is mostly constituted by agents working at home and is in favor of lower direct taxes and higher indirect 
taxes since the latter can be avoided through self-consumption. Moreover, our analysis suggest that 
this effect is conditional on the level of economic development and therefore the size of home 
production (and self-consumption) in the economy. In particular, the negative impact of 
democratisation on the share of direct to indirect taxes mitigates as the level of economic development 
increases.   
In order to investigate the empirical validity of our central theoretical prediction we develop a 
unique dataset of the Greek state that contains information for a large variety of tax instruments at: (i) 
the national level during the period 1833-1933, and (ii) the regional (i.e., provinces) level during the 
period 1853-1879. The empirical findings obtained from the national layer of our analysis suggest that 
                                                             
8
 Following the rationale of the relevant literature we assume the economy produces a single homogeneous good in the rural (home 
production) sector and in the market sector (see Ashraf and Galor, 2011 for more details on this).  
9
 We build our theoretical analysis on a median voter model since the Kingdom of Greece was characterized by a large number of small 
farmers and a noteworthy equal distribution of land (see Petmezas, 2003). This resulted from the decision of the Greek authorities to 
nationalize the great bulk of lands that belonged to Ottoman landowners after Independence in 1833. These lands were in turn rented for 
cultivation by the State to small peasants and landless sharecroppers (see Petmezas, 2003 and Appendix A2 for more details on this). 
The overall result of this policy concerning the so-called ³3XEOLF/DQGV´ was the formation of an agrarian economy characterized by 
significantly equal distribution of land and a substantial amount of home production (and self-consumption) especially in the rural areas 
(see Dertilis, 1993; Petmezas, 2003). In turn, with the Law of Sotiropoulos in 1871 Greek authorities distributed officially these lands to 
the peasantry (see Dertilis, 2015). The absence of significant concentration of ODQG¶VRZQHUVKLSLQWKHKDQGVRIDVPDOOODQGHGDULVWRFUDF\
makes the well-established theoretical models of intra-elite competition between the landholding autocratic elite and the industrial 
bourgeoisie (see, e.g., Ansell and Samuels, 2014; Beramendi et al., 2018) not suitable for the case of the Kingdom of Greece. 
5 
 
the external shock of enfranchisement in 1864 did not affect the level of total taxes as a share of GDP 
but exerted a significant impact on tax composition (see also Dertilis 1993; 2015). More precisely, 
universal male suffrage was accompanied by a significant decrease in the share of rural taxes (i.e., 
land and assessed taxes) and increases in specific categories of indirect taxes ±mostly custom duties 
and excises taxes. Political economy motives were behind the observed shifts in the implemented tax 
policy.10 Specifically, Greek governments decreased taxes on agriculture and livestock production in 
order to satisfy the large majority of the electorate -who was mostly constituted by peasants and 
farmers- and at the same time increased indirect taxes that did not harm the rural population, since the 
latter was able to avoid them through self-consumption.11 
To further reinforce this argument, building on a dataset of 43 tax administrative units (i.e., 
public cashiers) from 1853 to 1879, our analysis investigates whether the negative effect after 
democratisation on rural taxes was more intensive in provinces characterized by a higher share of 
population employed in the agriculture. This Difference-in-Difference (DD) specification directly 
relates to the idea of usiQJWKH³GRVDJH´RIVXIIUDJHLQH[DPLQLQJLWVHIIHFWRQSROLWLFDODQGHFRQRPLF
outcomes (see, e.g., Berlinski and Dewan, 2011). Consistent with our expectations, obtained empirical 
findings suggest that there is a clear-cut negative and significant relationship between the intensity of 
workforce in agriculture and rural taxes per capita at the regional level after democratisation.  
Finally, in order to check the generality of our results, we test our second hypothesis that this 
effect on tax structure is conditional on the level of economic development (as proxied by the 
prevalence of the agricultural sector). To this end, we explore the effect of democratisation on the size 
and composition of taxation for a sample of 12 Western European countries for the period 1841-1933. 
Our empirical findings suggest that democratisation is negatively correlated with the share of direct to 
indirect taxes when the percent of workforce occupied in agriculture is substantially high (above 60 
percent) as in the case of Greece. This effect is reversed gradually and becomes positive and significant 
when the agricultural sector drops below a certain threshold (~38 percent), which at high levels of 
development leads to an increase of total taxes as a share GDP. These results for Europe are compatible 
with previous empirical studies investigating similar issues (see e.g., Aidt and Jensen, 2009b) as well 
as with our theoretical priors.  
                                                             
10
 According to Dertilis (2015, pp 789-790), the major priority of the elected governments (but also of the Crown), at least during the 
first decades after independence in 1833, was to legitimize their authority. To this end, they mainly focused on policies that aimed to 
ensure a minimum level of social consensus and to convince the citizens of the young Greek state - the vast majority of which were 
living in rural areas - that the publiFGHPDQGVRIWKHZDURILQGHSHQGHQFHLH³VRFLDOMXVWLFH´³GHPRFUDF\´DQG³HTXDOLW\RISROLWLFDO
ULJKWV´ZRXOGEHVDWLVILHG 
11
 The policy decision to increase indirect taxes was compatible with the weak administrative capabilities and the narrow tax collection 
capacity of the Greek state during that period. This change harmed the population living in urban regions, since local or imported basic 
goods (wheat, textiles, and energy producing raw materials) were burdened by indirect taxes (see Dertilis, 2015, pp.794-799; pp.806-
808).  
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The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we provide some stylized facts about 
the tax structure in the Kingdom of Greece and we develop the theoretical framework. In Sections 3 
and 4 we discuss the data, our empirical strategy and the empirical results obtained from the national 
and regional empirical analysis in Greece. In Section 5 we present the corresponding empirical findings 
from the European sample.  Finally, in Section 6 we conclude.  
 
2. Stylized facts and the theoretical framework 
2.1 Stylized facts and empirical motivation 
In this section, we present some first descriptive evidence for the shape of tax policy in the Kingdom 
of Greece before and after the democratisation episode in 1864. Our national tax data contain 
information from the final fiscal accounts (i.e., Apologismoi) of the Greek state between 1833-1933. 
This database was developed mainly from the heroic efforts of Dertilis (1993) who tracked a significant 
number of historical fiscal accounts of the Greek state, and the subsequent significant contribution of 
Prontzas et al. (2011). George Dertilis has donated the original archival material to the Historical 
Archive of the National Bank of Greece (HANBG). It should be noted that in the HANBG, we obtained 
the fiscal statistics of the years 1853-1879 that we use in the regional analysis in Section 4. 
Dertilis (1993) classification is based on the methodology of Flora et al. (1983) that divides 
taxes into 13 broad tax categories: (1) land taxes, (2) assessed taxes, (3) trade taxes, (4) corporation 
taxes, (5) income tax, (6) property taxes, (7) inheritance taxes, (8) extraordinary taxes, (9) other direct 
taxes, (10) customs taxes, (11) excise taxes, (12) turnover taxes, and (13) other indirect taxes.12 All 
fiscal data are based on central government accounts. This is not a major shortcoming, since during 
that period local government finances in Greece were not significantly developed. Based on this 
classification, we construct two variables to measure the size and composition of taxation. First, we 
develop the variable total taxes as a share of GDP that is the sum of all tax categories (i.e., (1) to (13)). 
Data for GDP are taken from Kostelenos et al. (2007), who managed to compose reliable estimates of 
the magnitude of the Greek economy for the period of 1830-1939. Second, we develop the variable 
direct/indirect that is defined as the ratio of direct taxes (i.e., categories (1) to (9)) to indirect taxes 
(i.e., categories (10) to (13)).  
In turn, in order to further investigate the distributional implications of taxation, we develop 
the following variables - all expressed as a percentage of total taxes. The first variable is defined as 
rural taxes and is comprised by the summation of land and assessed taxes (i.e., categories (1) and (2)). 
Obviously, this variable covers taxes that are levied on land and/or earnings from agriculture and 
                                                             
12
 All variables are expressed in Drachmas, the currency of Greece during the 19th and 20th centuries. 
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livestock production. Second, we construct the variable urban taxes that includes the remaining tax 
categories (i.e., categories (3) to (9)). This includes taxes that are levied on earnings of small firms and 
profits of corporations, real estate property and inheritance taxes and, after 1911, the newly established 
(personal) income tax. As can be understood, urban taxes were mostly a burden to citizens that were 
living in more urbanised areas. Focusing on indirect taxation, we construct the variable customs taxes 
(i.e., category (10)) consisting of customs duties on the basis of the value of the imported commodities 
passing through custom houses.13 Finally, we develop the variable market taxes that is comprised by 
the summation of excise taxes, turnover taxes, and other indirect taxes (i.e., categories (11) to (13)). 
In Section A1 of Appendix A, we provide additional details about the national tax dataset employed 
in the analysis.  
Table 1 and Figure 1 record quantitative information on the tax structure in the Kingdom of 
Greece from 1833 to 1933. Table 1 presents the average values of the above-described variables for 
five selected periods, two before and three after the radical reform of enfranchisement in 1864. It is 
important to note that during the first period (1833-1844), the political regime was an absolute 
monarchy under the reign of King Otto that transformed to a constitutional monarchy (1845-1864) 
after the adoption of the Constitution of 1844.14 Then, in 1862, King Otto was overthrown by a rising 
of the guard and people of Athens and a series of events led to the appointment of a new monarch 
(George I) and the new Constitution of 1864 that established a crowned democracy with universal 
suffrage for all males aged 21 years old and above. According to the new constitution, instead of a 
ballot, voters could cast a small lead ball into one of the ballot boxes allocated to each one of the 
candidates standing for elections (see Figure C1 in Appendix C). This is of paramount importance 
since it allowed illiterates to participate in the electoral process without intervention of third parties, 
transferring therefore real power to the people. 
The first interesting stylized fact observed in Table 1 is that the level of total taxes remains 
relatively constant between the sub-periods (1845-1864) and (1865-1879). In other words, the reform 
of enfranchisement in 1864 did not lead to fiscal expansion as suggested by the relevant theoretical 
literature (see e.g., Meltzer and Richard, 1981) and previous historical empirical studies (see e.g., Aidt 
and Jensen, 2009b). The second interesting finding is that between the same sub-periods, rural taxes 
present a stark decrease from 56.7 to 38.5 percent of total taxes, whereas indirect taxes (summation of 
                                                             
13
 For exported commodities that the vast majority is agricultural goods, the duties form part of rural taxation. See Section A3 in 
Appendix A for more details on this.     
14
 In Section 3.1 we provide a more detailed description of the historical events that led to the gradual transformation of the political 
regime from absolute monarchy (1833-1844) to constitutional monarchy (1845-1864) and then to a crowned democracy (from 1865).  
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custom and market taxes) increased from 40.9 to 56.5. 15 This stylized fact becomes clear in Figure 1 
where, for years before 1864, the evolution of total taxes follows closely the evolution of rural taxes 
-which obviously constituted the main source of tax revenues during that period- whereas from 1864 
to 1920 total taxes co-move with indirect taxes. A large strand of the relevant literature (see e.g. Besley 
and Persson, 2011; 2013) suggests that governments rely heavier on indirect taxes in countries 
characterized by a less developed tax collection capacity. Specifically, in countries with weak fiscal 
institutions increased fiscal needs are usually covered to a greater extent by indirect taxes since they 
can be collected more easily. This stylized fact -which is mainly driven by tax collection capacity and 
not by the domestic political forces - is not what we observe in the Kingdom of Greece. This is because 
the tax collection technology argument obviously fails to explain why a government -even in low tax 
collection capacity economy- may decide to increase indirect taxes in order to replace direct taxes and 
at the same time to keep total tax revenues relatively intact. In other words, even if we assume that 
direct taxes are technologically more difficult to be collected we cannot explain the decision of the 
Greek authorities to reduce them without focusing on the potential political incentives behind this 
decision (see Dertilis, 1993 for more details on this issue). 
 
[Insert Table 1 and Figure 1 here] 
 
After 1920, the co-movement of total taxes with indirect taxes seems to be disrupted due to the 
sharp increase of urban taxes that takes place from 1920 to 1933. Although urban taxes remained 
relatively constant to a low level from 1864 to 1915 (around 6.7 percent of total taxes on average), 
after 1920 they increased substantially and remained at much higher levels (18.7 on average) - 
becoming in this way one additional basic source of tax revenues for the Kingdom of Greece. However, 
it should be noted that increased tax revenues from urban taxes during that period were not driven by 
higher reliance on regular forms of direct taxes like the (personal) income tax, rather than by increases 
on specific types of direct taxation (such as the extraordinary tax and other direct taxes).16 After 1920, 
the sharp increase in total taxes was the result of fiscal innovations -which were aiming to increase tax 
revenues- undertaken by the Kingdom of Greece during the previous years (i.e., before the Balkan 
Wars and WWI) mostly in order to encounter a series of military challenges. This stylized fact is in 
line with the theoretical predictions of scholars who suggest that military competition promoted 
                                                             
15
 In the years just before democratisation (1861-1863), decreases of rural taxes depicted in Figure 1 are mainly attributed to incidents 
of political instability after the expulsion of King Otto from Greece, which precluded the collection or submission of locally collected 
taxes to the Greek state (see Petrakis, 1985). 
16
 Although in 1911 Eleftherios Venizelos introduced the first modern personal income tax, the tax revenues from personal income 
taxation were insignificant until 1918 and exceeded 5 percent as a share of total taxes only in 1919. 
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investments in fiscal capacity that enabled states to raise tax revenues (see e.g., Hintze, 1906; Tilly 
1975, 1985; Dincecco and Prado, 2012). In Appendix A2 we provide a brief history of the evolution 
of the Greek tax system during the period 1833-1933, whereas in Appendix A3 we describe -in a more 
detailed way- the fiscal practices followed by the Kingdom of Greece to collect rural taxes from 1853 
to 1879. 
 
2.2 Theoretical framework: Tax structure in the presence of home production 
Motivated by the stylized facts described above, this section elaborates on the theoretical link between 
democratisation and the composition of taxes in the presence of home production. We develop a 
theoretical model of optimal taxation with heterogeneous agents that builds upon Persson and Tabellini 
(2000) but takes also into account the possibility of the agents working in home production (as in 
Gronau, 1977; 1986). Thus, individual consumption is composed of two goods, one good produced 
and purchased in the market thereby subject to a consumption tax, and a good that is produced by work 
at home and in turn is self-consumed. The home produced good is not subject to any indirect tax but 
the level of its consumption is harmed by taxes that burden home production (such as the land tithes). 
Private agents differ in their productivity and therefore they also differ in their supply of labor in the 
market. Specifically, the higher the productivity of an individual, the more likely is to work in the 
market. As a consequence, agents differ in the levels of home and market consumption and 
consequently have different preferences concerning the implemented tax policy. We solve the model 
for the median voter political equilibrium and then investigate the effects of changes on median 
productivity on the structure of taxation.17  
 
2.2.1 Behaviour of Private Agents 
The Households 
The economy is populated by a continuum of agents indexed by i. The preferences of individual i are 
quasi-linear, namely:  
 
 ( )i i iu c V x g      (1) 
 
where ic  and xi represents individual consumption and individual leisure, respectively, whereas g 
represents a public good common to all agents. Moreover, V(.) is increasing and concave in xi. 
                                                             
17
 This is because franchise extension to the poorer segments of the population inevitably implies a reduction in the median productivity 
of those with the right to vote. 
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Individual consumption ic  is composed of goods produced and purchased in the market iMc , and of 
goods produced at home that in turn are self-consumed iHc . Overall, total individual consumption 
equals:  
 
(1 )i i iM Hc c cT T  
        
(2) 
 
where 0 1T T d 
 
represents the level of economic development - with higher values denoting a 
more advanced economy characterized by higher levels of market consumption and lower levels of 
self-consumption.   
The market budget constraint for each agent is: 
 
(1 )i iM Cc q wl  
                 
(3a) 
 
where Cq is the consumption tax, w is the real wage rate and 
il is the individual labor supply in the 
market.18  
Home goods are produced by work at home, ih ,
 
according to a Cobb-Douglas production 
function ( )aH iA h  (0<Į<1), subject to a proportional tax Hq .19 So, the consumption of goods produced 
at home for each agent is: 
 
 (1 ) ( )i aH H H ic q A h 
                 
(3b) 
 
Substituting (3a) and (3b) into (2) we get the total private budget constraint: 
 
                                                             
18
 Since the main focus of the paper lies in agrarian economies with limited tax capacity, as in the case of Greece, we decided to solve 
our model without the income/labour tax that could have burdened market production. It must be noted that most of the 19th century 
fiscal states of Western Europe relied heavily on indirect taxes (custom taxes, excise duties etc.) as well as taxes on land (i.e. land tithes) 
(see e.g. Aidt and Jensen, 2009b). A permanent income tax was first introduced during the mid-19th century in a small number of 
economies (e.g., United Kingdom (1842), Austrian Empire (1849), Italy (1864)), and during the early 20th century in most of the current 
developed economies (e.g., Sweden (1902), France (1911), United States (1913), Germany (1920)). Moreover, in most of these 
economies tax revenues from income taxes stayed below 5 percent as a share of  total tax revenues until 1905 (see Aidt and Jensen, 
2009a for more details no this).  
19
 Before the emergence of solid fiscal states -characterized by increased capacity to levy income taxes- a usual practice to raise tax 
revenues was the so-called land tithes that were compulsory taxes imposed on home production (which was mostly constituted by 
agricultural crops) (see e.g., Aidt and Jensen, 2009b and Booney, 1999 for more details on this). In the case of Greece, taxes on gross 
home production consisted by dekati (that was a special form of land tithe) and epikarpia. For more details on the tax system in case of 
Greece during the 19th century, see Appendix A2 and A3. 
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Individual productivity differs, such that individuals have different amounts of ³HIIHFWLYH time´ 
available. That is, individuals are subject to the following ³WLPHFRQVWUDLQW´: 
 
1 i i i ie l x h   
           (5) 
 
where ie  is individual productivity which we assume that distributed in the population with mean e  
and median me (as in Persson and Tabellini, 2000, p.24).The government raises taxes using tax rates 
( , )C HQ q q , in order to finance the public good g .  
Households act competitively by taking the real wage rate w, the level of economic 
development ș and the policy variables ,C Hq q  as given. Substituting equations (4) and (5) into (1), 
the first-order conditions with respect to il  and ih  give, respectively20: 
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Then, by substituting (6) and (7) into (5) and solving for xi we get: 
 
1
1
i
x
C
w
x V
q
T ª º « »¬ ¼
          
(8) 
 
 
The Firms 
                                                             
20
 We assume that T  is adequately large so as to ensure that 0ih ! ,
 
and given that there is always an ei adequately large so as to ensure 
that 0il !  for this given level ofT . In that way we ensure that equations (6)-(8) conclude to an interior solution characterized by positive 
values of both li and hi.  
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The market economy is populated by j identical firms. We assume that the output produced in the 
market is governed by a linear production technology j jMy A l .21 Firms act competitively by taking 
the real wage rate w as given, and maximize their profits defined as: 
 
j j j
MA l wlS           (9)
 
 
where AM is the level of productivity in the market and lj the amount of labor employed by each 
identical firm j. The first order condition implies that: 
 
Mw A                  (10)
 
 
so that ʌj=0 in equilibrium. Equation (10) suggests that the real wage rate always equals to AM in the 
market. 
 
 
2.2.2. Average economic outcomes (labor supply, work at home, market and home consumption). 
Let ( , )C HL q q  denote the average labor supply in the market. By definition of the distribution:  
 
1
1
1(1 )(1 )(1 )( , ) 1
1
H H C M
C H x
M C
A q q AL q q e V
A q
DD T T
T
  ª ºª º      « »« » ¬ ¼ ¬ ¼
                        (11) 
 
which is decreasing in qC and increasing in qH.  
Similarly, let C ( , )M C Hq q  be the average market consumption, we can conclude that: 
 
( , )( , ) (1 )
M C H
M C H
C
A L q qC q q
q
                           (12) 
 
Let ( , )C HH q q  denote the average work at home. It can be easily verified that: 
 
                                                             
21
 Our analysis follows a similar rationale to that developed by Ashraf and Galor (2011) according to which the output produced in the 
rural sector is governed by a Cobb Douglas production technology and the output produced in the manufacturing sector is determined 
by a linear production technology.  
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which is increasing in qC and decreasing in qH. 
 
Similarly, let C ( , )H C Hq q  be the average consumption of home produced goods, we can conclude that: 
 
1(1 )(1 )(1 )C ( , ) (1 )
a
H H C
H C H H H
M
A q qq q q A
A
DD T
T
ª º    « »¬ ¼
             (14) 
 
It can be easily established from equations (6) and (11) that: 
 
( , ) ( )i C H il L q q e e  
                
(15)
 
 
So, for each agent with private productivity ie e!  we have ( , )i C Hl L q q!  and consequently (from 
equations (3a) and (12)) we get that ( , )iM M C Hc C q q! . Similarly, equations (7) and (13) suggest that 
all agents decide the same amount of work at home ( , )i C Hh H q q  and consequently (from equations 
(3b) and (14)) the same amount of self-consumption ( , )iH H C Hc C q q  irrespective of their private 
productivity ie .22 
 
2.2.3 National government budget constraint 
Having defined the average economic outcomes in the economy, we can now describe the budget 
constraint of the government. Tax revenues are raised through market consumption taxes ( Cq ) and 
taxes on home production ( Hq ) in order to finance the public good g  which is common to all agents. 
So, the budget constraint is as follows:  
 
 ( , ) (1 ) ( ( , ))aC M C H H H C Hg q C q q q A H q qT T                (16) 
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 Similarly we conclude that all agents decide the same amount of leisure irrespective of their private productivity, 
1( )
1
i M
C x
C
A
x X q V
q
T ª º  « »¬ ¼
 
 
14 
 
where ( , )M C HC q q is the average market consumption [given by equation (12)] and ( , )C HH q q  is the 
average work at home [given by equation (13)].  
 
2.2.4 Determination on national tax policies 
Substituting equations (4), (6)-(8), (10)-(14) and (16) into (1) we get that the policy preferences of 
agent i are as follows: 
 
( , ) ( ) ( , )+ ( ( )) (1 ) ( ( , ))
1
i M
C H i M C H C H H C H
C
AW q q e e A L q q V X q q A H q q
q
T T T                         (17a) 
 
As can be easily verified, the policy preferences of agent i can be rewritten as:  
 
( , ) ( ) ( ) ( , )i C H i C C HW q q K e S q J q q                      (17b) 
 
where ( )iK e  is monotonic in ei and ( )CS q , ( , )C HJ q q  are common to all agents. Therefore, agents 
have intermediate preferences and consequently a Condorcet winner always exists and is given by the 
bliss point of the median voter (i.e., the agent with the median productivity em) (see e.g., Grandmont, 
1978 for more details on this). 
So, the political equilibrium is the policy preferred by the voter with the median productivity 
em and is given by the following equation: 
  
 
0
m m
C H
W W
q q
w w  w w                  (18) 
  
where mW  denotes the indirect utility function of the median voter. Then, Appendix B shows: 
 
Proposition 1. For given levels of g, a decrease in the median productivity me  of the electorate, 
increases Cq and decreases Hq . Therefore, the extension of the voting franchise to the poorer segments 
of the population -that implies a lower level of me
 
for those with the right to vote- exerts a negative 
impact on the share of direct to indirect taxes ( H
C
q
q
). 
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This effect of changing median productivity on the structure of taxation is in line with the stylized facts 
we observe in Table 1 and Figure 1 for the case of Greece, which was a typical agrarian economy 
characterized by substantial levels of home production (and consequently self-consumption) during 
the whole 19th century.  
 
Moreover, Appendix B shows: 
 
Proposition 2. The positive effect of changing median productivity me  on the share of direct to indirect 
taxes ( H
C
q
q
) is conditional on the size of ș (i.e., the level of economic development). In particular, for 
lower values of ș the positive effect of changing median productivity on the share of direct to indirect 
taxes is stronger. 
  
In the following sections we seek to investigate the empirical validity of Propositions 1 and 2. More 
precisely, in Sections 3 and 4 we explore whether Proposition 1 holds in the case of the Kingdom of 
Greece that was a typical agrarian economy (characterized by substantial levels of home production) 
and in which the democratisation episode of  1864 led to a decrease in the median productivity of the 
electorate. In turn, in Section 5, we investigate the empirical validity of Proposition 2, using a sample 
of 12 Western European countries, characterized by different levels of economic development (and 
consequently different levels of home production) during the period 1841-1933. Specifically, we 
investigate whether the impact of democratisation on tax composition is conditional on the phase of 
economic development, and consistent to that case of Greece for countries with a similar structure in 
the economy.  
 
3. National analysis for the Kingdom of Greece 
3.1 Change on the political regime 
The main explanatory variable in the national layer of our analysis is a dichotomous variable developed 
by Boix et al. (2013) that takes the value of 1 if a country is categorized as democratic and 0 otherwise. 
The key political factors that Boix et al. (2013) considered in order to codify a period as democratic 
are: (1) popular elections of the executive and legislature; (2) multiple parties competing in the 
election; (3) unconsolidated incumbent advantage; and (4) at least half of the male electorate is 
enfranchised. According to these criteria, Greece is classified as democratic over the periods 1865-
1914 and 1926-1933, and as autocratic the remaining years, namely 1833-1864 and 1915-1925.  
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During the first decade after independence (1833-1843), the political regime was an absolute 
monarchy under the reign of King Otto.23 Only after the insurrection of 1843, which was led by 
Athenian garrisons backed by the demands of the Greek oligarchy, the ruler was compelled to adopt a 
constitution establishing a regime of constitutional monarchy. Remarkably, Greece was among the 
first three countries of the world who granted voting rights to almost all adult males aged 25 years old 
and over.24 However, the new constitution was monarchical, with all executive and legislative powers 
vested in the King. Moreover, this massive reform was mainly the result of the absence of a dominant, 
cohesive elite faction that would be able to impose a clear-cut authoritarian solution. In particular, the 
political environment consisted of evenly balanced elite factions that viewed enfranchisement of the 
illiterate rural population (~90 percent) as a good system of adjudicating their conflicts, while 
restricting the power of the King (see Alivizatos, 2011, pp. 93-94; Kalyvas, 2015, pp.50-52).25  
In 1862, King Otto was overthrown by a rising of the guard and people of Athens. A series of 
events led to the appointment of a new monarch, George I, and after long debates the new constitution 
of 1864 established a crowned democracy with universal suffrage for all males aged 21 years old and 
over. According to the new constitution, instead of a ballot, voters could cast a small lead ball into one 
of the ballot boxes allocated to each one of the candidates standing for elections (see Figure C1 in 
Appendix C). Interestingly, this reform was not part of the constitution when it was drafted initially 
and came as a result of a random and rather exogenous historical event. More precisely, it was proposed 
by the delegates of the Ionian Islands in their first participation in the National Assembly after the 
union of this region with Greece in 1864 (Alivizatos, 2011 pp.118-119 and Sotirelis, 1991 for more 
details on this issue). Actually, the Ionian Islands had a long tradition of applying this voting method, 
even from the period they were under the Venetian rule ± i.e., between the 14th and the 18th centuries 
(see e.g., Sotirelis, 1991). This external shock which facilitated voting without a ballot, is of paramount 
                                                             
23
 Actually, until Otto reach the age of majority (June 1, 1835), his sovereign rights in Greece were exercised by the so-called regency, 
which was made up of three councils appointed by the King of Bavaria Ludwig I. 
24
 Only paying guests or apprentices were excluded from this right. The other two countries that adopted universal male suffrage before 
Greece were France and Liberia (see Przeworski, 2009). In France, it was introduced with the constitution of 1793, but it never went 
into effect and no elections were held under it. Liberia proceeded in universal male suffrage in 1839, but voting rights were restricted 
again in 1847. 
25
 It is difficult to explain the sudden and smooth introduction of democratic institutions in the Kingdom of Greece. Especially, if 
someone takes into account that during that period it lacked a well-functioning state, a rising bourgeois class, an industrial working class 
and a vigorous urban culture - all factors associated with the rise of democracy in Europe in the 19 th century (see e.g. Moore, 1966). 
However, the Kingdom of Greece did enjoy an important advantage that can be linked to the early rise democratic institutions. Namely, 
a noteworthy equal distribution of land and consequently absence of a powerful elite of landowners that would oppose the extension of 
the voting franchise due to threat of expropriation. The existing local elites (proestoi) viewed democratic institutions as a good system 
of gaining political power through their privileged access to the illiterate rural population, restricting at the same time the power of King 
Otto who was the most powerful actor up to that point (see e.g. Sotirelis, 1991; Alivizatos, 2011; Kalyvas 2015 for more details on this 
issue). According to Przeworski (2006), a political environment of evenly balanced elite factions appears to be a sine qua non for a 
stable, self-enforcing democratic regime. In other words, democracy survives only when all the political forces that could overthrow it, 
agree that democratic elections are a good system of adjudicating their conflicts or at least are preferable over the feasible alternatives. 
Therefore, the balance of political power between local elites and the rising expectations of local politicians that the democratic regime 
could be manipulated through clientelistic practices are the key explanatory factors of the franchise reform in the Kingdom of Greece 
during that period.  
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importance since it allowed illiterates to participate in the electoral process without intervention of 
third parties, therefore transferring real power to the people. 
Despite various incidents of political instability, parliamentary governments functioned 
regularly for many decades and until 1914. However, disagreements between King Constantine, who 
succeeded King George after his assassination in 1913, and the Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos 
initiated a prolonged period of political instability. According to the Boix et al. (2013) classification, 
Greece is categorized as autocratic during the period of 1915-1925. This categorization is based on 
Greece¶V experience of a deep National Schism, the start of the Greco-Turkish war, and two military 
coups in 1922 and 1925 - each lasting two years. From 1926 until 1933, the remaining years of our 
sample, political stability was restored and Greece once again is classified as democratic.  
 
3.2 Empirical specification for national analysis 
To test the fiscal effects of the radical reform of 1864 in Greece at the national level we use annual 
data over the period 1833-1933 to estimate the following equation: 
 ݂݅ݏ݈ܿܽ݌݋݈݅ܿݕ௧ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵ݂݅ݏ݈ܿܽ݌݋݈݅ܿݕ௧ିଵ ൅ ߙଶ݀݁݉݋ܿݎܽܿݕ௧ ൅ ߚܺ௧ ൅ ߛ௧ ൅ ߝ௧                (19) 
 
where fiscal policyt stands for fiscal indicators, as described in Section 2.1; democracyt takes value 1 
if Greece is categorized as democratic in year t, and 0 otherwise; ܺ௧ is the vector of control to be 
discussed below; ߛ௧ is a trend that measures the effect of time on the dependent variable; and ߝ௧ is the 
error term. In all specifications, in line with many previous studies (e.g., Aidt et al., 2006), we include 
a lagged dependent variable on the right-hand side of our estimated equation to control for the fact that 
the evolution of tax policy exhibits a high degree of persistence.  
Regarding the additional covariates, first we consider the variable GDP per capita, the natural 
logarithm of real GDP per capita, to control for the effect of economic development on the level and 
composition of taxation (see Wagner, 1883). Related to that, we expect the structure of the economy, 
and more specifically the reliance on agricultural activity, to be a crucial determinant of the various 
tax bases and how taxes are levied. For this reason, we employ the percentage of population living in 
cities of less than two thousand people (denoted as agricultural rate), as proxy for the relative 
magnitude of the agricultural sector.26 Second, we employ the variable old, which is defined as the 
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 We use this variable, as provided by Dertilis (1993), to proxy for the size of the agricultural sector in Greece, since population statistics 
first became available in 1828 whereas occupational statistics in 1861. This allows us to avoid extrapolation of occupational data back 
in 1833 -the first year of our sample. However, when using the first occupational statistics from the census of 1861 we found that the 
percentage of the core occupations in agriculture -landowners, farmers and peasants- account for 63 percent of the total labour force. 
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percentage of the population aged 65 or older. According to Lindert (1994), the ageing of the 
population significantly increased the demand for intergenerational redistribution in Europe during the 
period of 1880-1930. Therefore, we expect a positive relationship between age structure and 
government size. 
A number of dummy variables are also included in our empirical specification. We intended to 
use the population size in order to control for the possibility that the public sector exhibits economies 
of scale (see, e.g., Mulligan et al., 2004; Aidt et al., 2006). However, we abstain from using this 
variable in our specification since it is highly correlated with the variable agricultural rate. Instead, 
we construct the dummy variable population spikes, which takes the value of 1 in the years that we 
observe significant increases in the population (e.g., annexation of regions), and 0 otherwise. Our next 
covariates allow us to control for the impact of economic crises on the implementation of fiscal policy 
in Greece. The variables debt crisis and currency crisis take the value of 1 if a debt (domestic or 
external) or a currency crisis, respectively, occurred during the year, and 0 otherwise. Finally, we 
include two dummy variables to control for the pressure of internal instability and wars on the 
implementation of fiscal policy. Table C1 in Appendix C provides descriptions, data sources, and 
descriptive statistics for all variables included in our regressions analysis in Section 3.  
 
3.3 Baseline results 
Our baseline results are reported in Table 2. In column (1), the main variable of interest, democracy, 
bears a non-significant effect on the variable total taxes. Therefore, our analysis suggests that the 
voting reform of 1864 did not lead to fiscal expansion as suggested by the relevant theoretical literature 
(see e.g., Meltzer and Richard, 1981) and previous historical empirical studies from Western European 
countries (see e.g., Aidt et al., 2006; Aidt and Jensen, 2009b). However, this empirical finding fits our 
theoretical priors since the Kingdom of Greece was an agrarian economy characterized by a low tax 
collection capacity. Moreover, this result is in accordance with previous historical studies for Greece 
suggesting that total tax revenues remained relatively stable during the whole 19th century (see Dertilis 
and Kostis, 1995; Kostis, 2006, pp.307-316).  
In contrast, in column (2) democracy enters with a negative and statistically significant 
coefficient at the 1% level. This result highlights the significant reduction in the share of direct to 
indirect taxes after democratisation. Moreover, when direct taxes are further decomposed between 
rural taxes and urban taxes [in columns (3) and (4), respectively] we see that democracy bears a 
negative and highly significant coefficient in the former, whereas no effect is found on the latter. 
                                                             
Moreover, when also taking into account other occupations related to the agricultural sector (e.g., muleteers, merchandisers and workers) 
this figure increases above 70 percent and is very close to the figure obtained from population statistics. 
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Finally, in columns (5) and (6), we investigate the impact of the franchise reform on indirect taxes. As 
can be easily verified, democracy bears a positive and statistically significant coefficient when related 
to customs taxes at the 1% level. 
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
These effects are consistent with our theoretical priors. As we have already noted, given the 
presence of a large home production sector, a decrease on median productivity after the franchise 
reform induces increases on indirect taxes and decreases on taxes that burden home production (i.e., 
rural taxes). Obviously, these changes were in favour of the rural population and at the expense of the 
population living in urban areas. This is because rural population was affected positively by the 
decrease of land and assessed taxes, but also it was not substantially harmed from increases on indirect 
taxes due to the ability of self-consumption that was inevitably higher in rural areas. In contrast, the 
population living in urban regions -including its poorer segments- did not exhibit the option of self-
consumption and thus was significantly harmed by increases on indirect taxes. Our analysis suggests 
that there were political economy incentives behind observed shifts in the implemented tax policy. The 
Greek authorities decided this composition of taxation in order to ensure a minimum social cohesion 
and moreover to satisfy the majority of their electorate, which was constituted of peasants and farmers 
living in rural areas (see Dertilis, 1993; Palairet, 1979).27  
It should be noted that the empirical findings in Table 2 -especially concerning the increases 
on custom taxes- cannot fully exclude alternative theoretical explanations. For instance, one may argue 
that countries characterized by poor fiscal capacity and low administrative capabilities inevitably rely 
heavier on international trade taxes which are a more easy-to-collect-tax (see e.g., Besley and Persson, 
2011, 2013), or that increases on custom duties act as a mean of protection of the domestic production 
from international competition. Both of these arguments may sound sensible but fail to provide 
satisfactory answers for the full set of stylized facts under consideration. In particular, they fail to 
provide a clear-cut explanation for the decision of the Greek authorities to keep total taxes relatively 
constant and to combine increases in indirect taxes with reductions in rural taxes. After all, even if we 
assumed that rural taxes were a more difficult-to-collect tax, there is no economic argument supporting 
their remarkable reduction and the fact that it took place after democratisation. Similarly, the 
                                                             
27
 Along these lines, Brender and Drazen (2007) suggest that the attitude of the citizenry towards democracy is important in preventing 
democratic collapse, and fiscal manipulation can act as an instrument to convince them that "democracy works".  In line with this 
argument, Kammas and Sarantides (2016) show that when the democratic regime is not fully consolidated (i.e., new democracy), 
incumbents implement pre-HOHFWRUDOUHGLVWULEXWLYHSROLFLHVLQRUGHUWRVLJQDOWKDW³GHPRFUDF\ZRUNV´WKHUHE\SUHYHQWLQJDUHYHUVLRQ
WRDQDXWRFUDWLFVWDWXVTXRDWDWLPHRIWKHUHJLPH¶VH[WUHPHYXOQHUDELOLW\  
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protectionist argument fails to provide a sensible explanation of why trade policy should be combined 
with decreases in land tithes and increases in a series of domestic market taxes. It is clear from the 
above, that alternative arguments which do not highlight the distributional implication of the 
implemented tax policy, and the potential political economy incentives behind the policy shifts, are 
weak at best.28 
We also estimate the long-run effect of democratisation on fiscal policy instruments. To do so, 
the coefficient of the variable democracy ሺߙଶሻ from equation (19) should be divided by ሺ ? െ ߙଵሻ, 
where ߙଵ is the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable. According to our estimates, the change 
in the composition of taxation in favour of indirect taxes is driven mainly by the long-run decrease in 
the share of rural taxes by 8.9 percent, and by the long-run increase in the share of customs taxes by 
14.55 percent. Given that the mean value of the former is 32.48 percent and of the latter is 34.07 
percent, it is clear that this effect is quantitatively sizable.  
Lastly, we discuss our empirical findings concerning the rest of the covariates reported in Table 
2. First, as expected, the lagged dependent variable bears a positive and statistically significant 
coefficient in all our estimates.29 Moreover, we observe that the variables that capture the level of 
economic development, namely GDP per capita and agricultural rate enter with non-significant 
coefficients in most of the specifications. As expected, the variable debt crisis decreases the size of tax 
revenues, whereas the variable currency crisis is found to decrease the share of direct to indirect taxes 
mainly through its negative impact on urban taxes. Finally, the variable internal instability deteriorates 
the level of tax revenues.  
 
3.4 Sensitivity analysis 
In this section, we examine the robustness of the results obtained in Table 2. First, we check the 
sensitivity of our results to the set of covariates included in the analysis. Including a fairly large set of 
covariates, limits degrees of freedom, whereas coefficients could be unstable in the presence of 
collinearity. For this reason, we choose to exclude from the analysis controls debt crisis, currency 
crisis, internal instability and wars, since some of these covariates are likely, at least in part, to be 
effects of the regime type - for instance the occurrence of debt and currency crises. Such crises are 
endogenous to political decisions that may, in turn, differ systematically between democratic and non-
democratic periods. Hence, the estimated effect of democracy may suffer from post-treatment bias. 
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 For an alternative political economy argument that builds on a theoretical model of trade in vertically differentiated products and 
explains the heavy reliance of developing economies on revenues from tariffs, see Moutos (2001) and Adam et al., (2011).  
29
 To assess if the dynamic specification can affect the interpretation of our results, we transformed equation (19) to an Error Correction 
Model (ECM). As can be seen in panel A of Table C4 in Appendix C, the qualitative and quantitative results we obtain for the long-run 
effects of democratisation on fiscal instruments are essentially the same to those obtained from the estimates in Table 2. 
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However, the qualitative results presented in panel A of Table 3, remain essentially the same as those 
depicted in Table 2. 
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
Next, we check whether our results remain qualitatively similar when the time period of our 
sample is restricted from 1845 to 1915. Our motivation to employ this restricted sample is twofold: 
First, as already mentioned, the initial significant political reform that increased the political power of 
the agricultural population took place in 1844. Therefore, if our results in the restricted sample continue 
to hold, we demonstrate that the second more radical constitution of 1864 is indeed a significant 
determinant of our results. Second, we choose to limit our sample prior to 1915 since after that year, 
and for a decade, the Kingdom of Greece faced a prolonged period of instability with internal and 
external conflicts - with more important incidents the Great Division of Greece (the so-called National 
Schism) and the Greco-Turkish war of 1919-1922.30 These events seem to have affected significantly 
the size and composition of taxation - see Table 1 and Figure 1- so we opt to restrict our sample before 
their start. As can be seen in panel B of Table 3, our results for the restricted sample continue to hold. 
A notable difference though is that the effect of the franchise reform on the share of direct to indirect 
taxes appears to be significantly higher. 
The final check we report in panel C of Table 3 is to restrict the time period of our sample even 
further and in particular from 1853 to 1879. This time period is identical to the time period of our 
sample when we proceed to the regional analysis for the Kingdom of Greece in the next section. The 
starting time period of our sample in the regional analysis is dictated by data availability and is the 
first year for which tax data at the province level become available. The ending time period of our 
sample in 1879 guarantees a consistent set of instruments through which tax revenues are collected, 
and at the same time territorial stability regarding the provinces in which these taxes are levied. 
Regarding tax instruments, during 1853-1879 the only tax innovation we observe concerns the 
corporate tax, which is established in 1876 but contributes only up to 0.5 per cent of annual tax 
revenues until 1879. It was only in 1880 that the excise tax was introduced, the second most fruitful 
indirect tax of the Greek state after custom duties on imported goods. With respect to territorial 
stability, during 1853-1879 only the Ionian Islands are annexed in Greece in 1864, covering around 5 
                                                             
30
 The National Schism that split Greece into two entities was the result of a series of disagreements between King Constantine I and 
Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos regarding the foreign policy of Greece. 
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per cent of the total land area of the Kingdom of Greece.31 Due to the limited size of our sample in this 
specification we employ the limited set of controls applied in panel A. As can be seen in panel C, 
results once more indicate the replacement between rural taxes and customs taxes after the 
democratisation episode in 1864.  
In Table C4 in Appendix C we report some additional robustness checks. First, as already 
mentioned, in panel A we report estimates of the long-run effect of democratisation using an ECM. 
Second, in Panel B ZHVXEVWLWXWH%RL[HWDO¶VPHDVXUHof democracy, with the variable polity2 
from the Polity IV Project (Marshall and Jaggers, 2010). This index has been applied as a tool to 
classify political regimes (democracy versus autocracy) in a large number of studies (see e.g., Haber 
and Menaldo, 2011; Harrison and Wolf, 2012), though a closer look at it suggests that it mainly focuses 
on the institutional side of political competition (see, Vanhanen, 2000). However, it offers the 
advantage of varying from -10 (extreme autocracy) to +10 (perfect democracy), thus allowing for a 
larger variation in the sample. Third, in panel C we proceed by re-estimating the empirical model 
presented in Table 2 by skipping observations with a standardized residual above 1.96 or below -1.96. 
Finally, as it is possible that the errors in Table 2 are correlated between the estimated equations, in 
panel D we re-estimate our baseline specification by the Seemingly Unrelated Regression Equations 
(SURE) model. As can be easily verified, in all alternative cases, obtained empirical findings are 
qualitatively identical to those presented in Table 2. 
 
4. Regional analysis for the Kingdom of Greece 
In this section, we seek to provide further evidence in favour of our theoretical priors by employing 
regional data. To this end, we investigate whether the negative effect of democratisation on rural taxes 
was more intensive in provinces characterized by higher share of population employed in the 
agriculture. We cannot apply a similar strategy to examine the distribution of customs taxes since 
regional information for custom duties on imported goods is limited until 1863, whereas from 1864 
onwards only their aggregate value at the national level is reported.  
 
4.1 Rural taxes  
Tax revenues in the Kingdom of Greece were collected in public cashiers within each municipality 
and in a limited number of custom houses across the Greek territory (see Section A3 in Appendix A). 
The administrative division of Greece during the 19th century consists of regions (peripheries), 
                                                             
31
 In 1881, the Convention of Constantinople was signed between the Kingdom of Greece and the Ottoman Empire, resulting in the 
cession of the region of Thessaly and a part of southern Epirus (i.e., Arta) to Greece - of total area 13.395 square kilometres, or 21 per 
cent of the Greek territory at that time. 
23 
 
provinces (i.e., eparxiai), municipalities and communities. Our regional analysis uses province-level 
data for the years 1853-1879, since this is the lower level of aggregation for which tax data are 
available. All final regional fiscal accounts (i.e., Apologismoi) employed in the current study were 
tracked down in the HANBG. For the years 1853-1855 data were provided in microfilms, whereas 
from 1858 onwards from the available volumes as published by the Greek state back in the 19th century. 
Unfortunately, regional accounts for years 1856 and 1857 were missing from the collection.  
Figure C2 in Appendix C reports the fiscal revenues of the land tax for the year of 1863. Our 
sample for the regional analysis includes 43 tax administrative units. Figure C3 shows the borders of 
the 48 provincial units of the Greek state before the union with Ionian Islands - the so called old 
Greece- and the adjustments that need to be made for the final 43 tax administrative units of our 
sample.  
To construct our variable rural taxes for the regional analysis, we use rural tax receipts - 
consistent with the national analysis- that are now expressed in real per capita terms. Population 
statistics are taken from the censuses of 1853, 1861, 1870 and 1879, which are interpolated between 
census years to fully populate the panel. Moreover, to express our variables in real terms we use price 
level data from Lazaretou (2014), who gathered and composed data from various sources (e.g., 
Kostelenos et al., 2007), with reliable estimates of the magnitude and the trends of the Greek economy 
for the period of 1830-1939. 
 
4.2 Agricultural rate 
To estimate the relationship between rural tax burdens and the agricultural rate we exploit the variation 
in the concentration of the peasantry across provinces. Our key independent variable, farmers and 
peasants 1861, refers to the percentage of peasants and farmers to the total population at the province 
level according to the occupational statistics of the 1861 census. We prefer this fixed measure of 1861 
since it is less likely to be endogenous to taxation trends than a population share that changes over 
time (see e.g., Cascio and Washington, 2013; Carruthers and Wanamaker, 2015).  
 As can be seen in Table C2 in Appendix C, there is significant variation in the geographic 
distribution of the peasantry across provinces. In particular, the average of our main variable farmers 
and peasants 1861 in the sample is 17.08 percent, the median is slightly to the right of the mean (17.95 
percent), with lower and higher values 2.84 and 28.43 percent respectively. Of course, population 
shares across provinces are not exogenously assigned and can be correlated with potential confounders. 
For instance, peasantry concentration can be confounded by climatic and geographic factors that can 
enhance agricultural productivity. If the province characteristics that vary systematically with the value 
of this variable are also correlated with tax outcomes, a model that regresses these outcomes on farmers 
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and peasants 1861 would return biased and inconsistent estimates. To tackle this issue, our estimations 
include province fixed effects with the aim to absorb any such unobserved, province-specific and time-
invariant characteristics that could confound the true relationship. 
 
4.3 Empirical specification for regional analysis 
To estimate the relationship between peasantry concentration and rural tax receipts after the reform of 
1864 we employ the following Difference-in-Difference (DD) specification: 
 ݎݑݎ݈ܽݐܽݔ݁ݏ௜௧ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵ݀݁݉݋ܿݎܽܿݕ௧ כ ݂ܽݎ݉݁ݎݏܽ݊݀݌݁ܽݏܽ݊ݐݏ ? ? ? ?௜ ൅ ߠ௜ ൅ ߠ௧ ൅ ൅ݐ כ ߠ௜ ൅ ߚ ௜ܺ௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧                   (20) 
 
where rural taxesit denotes real per capita tax receipts from agricultural and livestock production in 
province i at time t (in 1860 Drachmas); democracyt is an indicator variable equalling one in years 
greater than or equal to 1865, and 0 otherwise; farmers and peasants 1861i represents the measure of 
peasantry concentration described above. The model also includes province, și, and year fixed effects, 
șt, to control for all time-invariant province characteristics and shocks common to all provinces, 
respectively. Because farmers and peasants 1861i is constant within provinces and democracyt is 
constant within province-years, only the interaction between the two remains in the model and is 
captured by the parameter ߙଵ. We also allow provinces to diverge over time by including province-
specific time trends, t*și. The matrix of province-level observable characteristics, ௜ܺ௧, includes 
(province) population and population squared, to account for differences between provinces with large 
and smaller concentration of population and their connected non-linearities; population density, a 
commonly used proxy of prosperity and urbanization; and the share of delayed payments of rural tax 
receivables. The latter variable is defined as the percentage of delayed rural tax payments to the total 
tax receivables expected by the state. We control for this variable in order to isolate our outcome 
variable (tax receipts) from any effect that stems from delayed payments. This variable allows us to 
capture incidences within the Greek territory that preclude tax collection or submissions of locally 
collected taxes to the Greek state.32 These four covariates are the only ones that can be calculated 
without extrapolation. Finally, İit is an error term. To address serial correlation concerns and to allow 
for heteroscedasticity, the standard errors are clustered at the province level (Bertrand et al. 2004).  
                                                             
32For instance, in 1861 the share of delayed payments of rural taxes was 9.2 per cent, while the following year that King Otto was 
expelled from Greece it increased at a level close to 20 percent. It should be noted that delayed payments is correlated at a moderate 
level close to 15 percent with the variable farmers and peasants 1861. 
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This empirical specification directly relates to the idea of using the `dosage' of suffrage in 
examining its effect on political and economic outcomes. It was first applied by Berlinski and Dewan 
(2011), and now is a widely employed technique in the relevant literature (Cascio and Washington, 
2013; Vernby 2013; Larcinese 2014; Carruthers and Wanamaker 2015). The merit of this method is 
that it allows to identify how local authorities, or the electorate at the local level, react to an exogenous 
shock imposed by the central/national government. In our case, though, the motivation differs since 
we are interested to examine changes in the behaviour of the central government that affects directly 
the geographical distribution of a policy variable (see e.g., Jablonski, 2014; Kroth et al., 2016).   
As described in Section A3 in Appendix A, during that period the distribution of the rural tax 
burdens within the Kingdom of Greece was actually decided in two stages. First, for each tax 
instrument the central government was budgeting the expected amount of revenues for each 
administrative unit. This amount was determined by production capability, the tax rates set by the state, 
but also, and more importantly for our study, by the willingness of the state to collect taxes consistently 
within the Greek territory. Second, local notables and authorities (depending on the tax instrument) 
were monitoring the process on behalf of the state so that the expected amount of taxes for each 
administrative unit was collected. Both the central government and the local elites - acting as 
intermediaries between elected officials and the local population through their own clientelistic 
networks - had political economy incentives to implement a tax policy that was in favour of farmers 
and peasants, especially after the franchise reform constituted the latter as the ultimate political 
majority. However, it should be noted that before the absorption of the tax policy by the local elites, it 
was in the discretion of the central government to apply the tax rules consistently for all regions of the 
Kingdom. A remarkable example is the province of Gytheio that average collected rural taxes per 
capita do not exceed 0.1 between 1853-1879, when the average value of our sample is 6.13. One 
explanation for this extreme phenomenon is that part of rural taxes from this province were collected 
in the nearest custom house (see Petmezas, 2003), therefore not included in the regional account. 
However, another significant reason is the unwillingness of the state to impose its policies in this area 
that had a long tradition of protesting against the state - even from the era of the Ottoman Empire (see 
Aroni-Tcichli, 2009). We proceed in the regional analysis because of the significant discretion of the 
state to distribute tax burdens differently, arguing that its willingness to be consistent is affected 
negatively by the concentration of peasants and farmers across provinces - i.e., in regions were more 
home production (and therefore more political power) is concentrated after the reform we expect a 
higher reduction in rural taxes per capita. 
 
 
26 
 
4.4 Results 
Columns (1)-(3) in Table 4 list the coefficient from the DD specification in equation (20). Column (1) 
includes province and year fixed effects, whereas in columns (2) and (3) we add progressively regional 
time trends and the additional covariates. As can be seen, the DD coefficient (democracy*farmers and 
peasants) is negative and statistically significant, and the most moderate estimate in column (3) 
indicates that a percentage point increase in the agricultural population is associated with a decrease 
in rural taxes per capita after democratisation by 0.078 points. Evaluated at the mean value of the 
agricultural rate proxy this implies a 1.33 points decrease in rural taxes. Using the mean value of rural 
taxes before 1864, this effect accounts a 17 percent decrease in rural taxes in the province with the 
average size of peasantry concentration. Therefore, consistent with Proposition 1, we obtain clear 
indications that in provinces characterized by more extensive home production -as proxied by the 
number of peasants and farmers in the population - the central government reacts more leading to a 
more pronounced reduction in rural taxes.  
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
Next, we turn to the question of whether the estimated effects were fleeting or persisted over 
time. To explore this possibility, equation (20) is transformed in the following way:  
 ݎݑݎ݈ܽݐܽݔ݁ݏ௜௧ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵ ଵ଼ܶ଺ହǡଵ଼଺଼ כ ݌݁ܽݏܽ݊ݐݏܽ݊݀݂ܽݎ݉݁ݎݏ ? ? ? ?௜ ൅ ߙଶ ଵ଼ܶ଺ଽǡଵ଼଻ଶ כ݌݁ܽݏܽ݊ݐݏܽ݊݀݂ܽݎ݉݁ݎݏ ? ? ? ?௜ ൅ ߙଷ ଵ଼ܶ଻ଷǡଵ଼଻଺ כ ݌݁ܽݏܽ݊ݐݏܽ݊݀݂ܽݎ݉݁ݎݏ ? ? ? ?௜ ൅ ߙସ ଵ଼ܶ଻଻ǡଵ଼଻ଽ כ݌݁ܽݏܽ݊ݐݏܽ݊݀݂ܽݎ݉݁ݎݏ ? ? ? ?௜ ൅ ߠ௜ ൅ ߠ௧ ൅ ݐ כ ߠ௥ ൅ ߚ ௜ܺ௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧   (21) 
 
 
this functional form allows the relationship between agricultural rate and rural taxation to vary  over 
four time horizons: 1865-1868, 1869-1872, 1873-1876, and 1877-1879, each relative to the omitted 
window of 1853-1864. Results of equation (21) are displayed in column (4). As can be seen, the 
coefficient is negative and statistically significant between 1865-1872, and 1877-1879 indicating a 
relative constant relationship over time after the reform of 1864.  
However, it remains possible that heterogeneous trends are present and induced decreases in 
rural taxes in high-agricultural provinces, even in the absence of democratisation. To examine this 
possibility, we restrict our sample prior to 1864 and assess the importance of our key independent 
variable in determining trends in rural taxation. Specifically, we modify equation (20) to estimate the 
following for fiscal years 1853-1863:  
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ݎݑݎ݈ܽݐܽݔ݁ݏ௜௧ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵݐݎ݁݊݀௧ ൅ ߙଶݐݎ݁݊݀௧ כ ݂ܽݎ݉݁ݎݏܽ݊݀݌݁ܽݏܽ݊ݐݏ ? ? ? ?௜ ൅ ߚ ௜ܺ௧ ൅ ߠ௜ ൅ ߝ௜௧   
(22) 
 
The main aim is to test whether high farmers and peasants 1861 provinces had different trends before 
1864 (i.e., ߙଶ7KHUHVXOWVUHSRUWHGLQcolumn (5), show a downward trend in rural taxes, but more 
importantly no evidence of a differential trend in rural taxation amongst provinces related to the size 
of the agricultural rate.  
Our estimations so far rely on a measure of peasantry concentration that includes peasants and 
farmers. From this calculation, we exclude deliberately two other occupational categories provided in 
the census of 1861, the landowners and the workers, despite the fact that especially the former group 
earns its income directly from agriculture. Landowners are excluded because it is expected to belong 
to a higher income class in comparison to farmers and peasants. Workers, on the other hand, because 
they can be occupied, especially in more developed areas, in activities other than the agricultural sector. 
Thus, considering only farmers and peasants guarantees a minimum level of income and occupational 
homogeneity in the group that dominated the structure of the Greek economy during the 19th century. 
However, in columns (6) and (7) we experiment with variables landowners 1861 and workers 1861, 
respectively, to examine the possibility of association of other agriculturally related occupations with 
rural taxes. As can be seen, results in both cases are statistically insignificant.  
Furthermore, as already mentioned, for the main indirect tax of period 1853-1879, customs 
taxes, regional information is not available. Despite that, we can construct a measure of indirect taxes 
per capita for the remaining tax categories of that period. These include charges on stamping notarial 
deeds, court fees, and µYDULRXVRWKHUULJKWV¶ZKLFKUHSUHVHQWKDUERXUGXHVFRQVXODUFKDUJHVDQGRWKHU
similar fees. In column (8), a specification similar to equation (20) returns no significant relationship 
between agricultural intensity and indirect taxes after the democratisation. This result provides 
additional evidence that tax changes after 1864 were targeted to favour the new political majority, 
through decreases in rural taxes, and it is not simply a generalised downward trend in taxation in 
agricultural areas.    
Finally, in order to provide further evidence of potential political economy motives behind 
observed shifts in the implemented tax policy, our analysis incorporates the variable voter turnout that 
captures the percentage of actual voters in the national elections of 1879 among those that were 
enfranchised. The choice of year is dictated by data availability, since this is the only year during 1853-
1879 that turnout statistics were reported by Greek authorities. Our new Difference-in-Difference-in-
Difference (DDD) specification that exploits variation also along the dimension of political 
participation has the following form: 
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 ݎݑݎ݈ܽݐܽݔ݁ݏ௜௧ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵ݀݁݉݋ܿݎܽܿݕ௧ כ ݂ܽݎ݉݁ݎݏܽ݊݀݌݁ܽݏܽ݊ݐݏ ? ? ? ?௜ ൅ ߙଶ݀݁݉݋ܿݎܽܿݕ௧ כݒ݋ݐ݁ݎݐݑݎ݊݋ݑݐ௜ ൅ ߙଷ݀݁݉݋ܿݎܽܿݕ௧ כ ݂ܽݎ݉݁ݎݏܽ݊݀݌݁ܽݏܽ݊ݐݏ ? ? ? ?௜ כ ݒ݋ݐ݁ݎݐݑݎ݊݋ݑݐ௜൅ߠ௜ ൅ ߠ௧ ൅ݐ כ ߠ௥ ൅ ߚ ௜ܺ௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧   (23) 
 
where voter turnout is our proxy for the propensity of the population at the province level to participate 
in the electoral process after democratisation. The rest of the variables are defined as earlier. It should 
EHQRWHGWKDWWKHHVWLPDWHGĮ1 in this specification captures the expected effect of democracy*farmers 
and peasants 1861 when voter turnout is zero. The coefficient of interest here is Į3, which indicates 
how differences in peasantry concentration between provinces affect rural taxes as the size of voter 
turnout after the reform increases. Consistent with our hypothesis the DDD coefficient
 
in column (9) 
turns out negative and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Therefore, we get evidence that 
that the intensity of political participation of the peasantry at the province level matters for the size of 
reduction in rural tax burdens.  
 
5. The conditional effect of suffrage extension in Europe 
In this section, we explore the effect of democratisation on the size and the composition of taxation for 
a sample of 12 Western European countries for the period 1841-1933. This allows us to investigate the 
empirical validity of Proposition 2 and therefore to add generality to our results.33 The main hypothesis 
under investigation is that the impact of democratisation on the tax structure is conditional on the phase 
of economic development, and consistent to the case of Greece for countries with a similar structure 
in the economy. In contrast to Greece, most of these European countries were not typical agrarian 
economies during the period of their democratisation. In particular, their average figure of the 
workforce occupied in the agriculture sector upon democratisation is half that of Greece, namely about 
38 percent (see Figure 2). Two more points are worth noting about this Figure. First, the only country, 
according to Boix et al. (2013), that democratised before Greece, is Switzerland in 1856, with almost 
80 percent of the adult male population enfranchised (Flora et al., 1983). Second, it is evident that 
some countries (e.g., Finland and Italy) are closer to the Greek case, whereas others differ 
significantly.34  
 
                                                             
33
 The countries in our sample are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, 
Switzerland and United Kingdom. 
34
 This difference EHWZHHQ*UHHFHDQG(XURSHLVUDWKHUXQGHUVWDWHGLIZHFRQVLGHUWKDW%RL[HWDO¶VFODVVLILFDWLRQUHTXLUHVDPRQJ
others, more than 50 percent of the male population to be enfranchised for a country to be qualified as democratic. In the case of Greece 
after the big voting reform in 1864 almost 100 percent of the male population was granted voting rights. 
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[Insert Figure 2 here] 
 
To test the effect of democratisation on fiscal outcomes for the European sample, we estimate 
the following equation for the period 1841-1933:35 
 ݂݅ݏ݈ܿܽ݌݋݈݅ܿݕ௜௧ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵ݂݅ݏ݈ܿܽ݌݋݈݅ܿݕ௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߙଶ݀݁݉݋ܿݎܽܿݕ௜௧ ൅ ߙଷܽ݃ݎ݅ܿݑ݈ݐݑݎ݈ܽݎܽݐ݁௜௧ ൅ߙସܦ݁݉݋ܿݎܽܿݕ௜௧ כ ܽ݃ݎ݅ܿݑ݈ݐݑݎ݈ܽݎܽݐ݁௜௧ ൅ ߚ ௜ܺ௧ ൅ ߛ௜ ൅ ߜ௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧   (24) 
 
where fiscal policyit is a fiscal indicator in country i in year t; fiscal policyit-1 is the respective lagged 
dependent variable; ݀݁݉݋ܿݎܽܿݕ௜௧ is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if country i in year t is 
categorized as democratic, and 0 otherwise; ܽ݃ݎ݅ܿݑ݈ݐݑݎ݈ܽݎܽݐ݁௜௧ is the percentage of the workforce 
in agriculture; ௜ܺ௧ is the vector of additional control variables; and correspond to country and 
time fixed effects, respectively, and  is the error term.36 As can be seen, equation (19) has been 
augmented with the interaction term democracyit*agricultural rateit, in order to test our second 
hypothesis.  
The focus on these European countries is due to the fact that Flora et al. (1983) provides directly 
comparable fiscal data to that employed for the case of Greece. Moreover, although these European 
countries had significant differences in the rules and institutions that governed fiscal policy during that 
period, they share similar economic and political characteristics that make them an appealing sample 
for panel analysis.37 The tax variables that we employ in this section are identical to those of Section 
3. Moreover, we employ the same controls, with only one exception. More specifically, for the case of 
Greece we preferred the variable population spikes because the actual population size was highly 
correlated with the agricultural rate. However, in the case of European countries we do not face the 
same limitation. For this reason, we construct the variable population, which is defined as the natural 
logarithm of the population of the country. Table C3 in Appendix C provides descriptions, data 
sources, and descriptive statistics for all variables included in our regressions analysis in Section 5.  
Table 5 reports our results for the European sample. As can be seen in panel A, the variable 
democracy is positively correlated with total taxes and the share of direct to indirect taxes. Moreover, 
                                                             
35
 Although for some countries fiscal data are available from year 1833 onwards (e.g., UK, France), due to data limitations of other 
variables, our sample starts in 1841.  
36
 The inclusion of a lagged dependent variable introduces a potential bias in the dynamic Fixed Effects model by not satisfying the strict 
H[RJHQHLW\DVVXPSWLRQRIWKHHUURUWHUPİit. As shown in the literature, the estimated bias of this formulation is of order 1/T, where T is 
the time length of the panel, even as the number of countries becomes large (see, among others, Nickell, 1981). Since, the average length 
of our panel ranges from 41 to 60 years -in different specifications- in our case, the potential bias appears to be negligible. 
37
 An obvious example is the case of Germany, where the central government reserved the right to levy and collect a significant amount 
of direct taxes close to the beginning of WWI (Ritschl, 2003). 
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we observe that these changes are driven by the increase in urban taxes and the decrease of both 
categories of indirect taxes, customs taxes and market taxes. However, and more importantly, these 
effects are conditional on the structure of the economy as revealed by our results for the interaction 
term democracy*agricultural rate. The interaction term is negative and statistically significant when 
related to the variables total taxes, direct/indirect, urban taxes, while the opposite holds when related 
to customs taxes - the effect on market taxes is also positive but insignificant. Therefore, our empirical 
findings suggest that the phase of economic development, and the consequent structure of the 
economy, results in a differentiated effect of democratisation on the size and structure of taxation.   
 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
To further elucidate this, we calculate the partial derivative for each dependent variable in 
Table 5, with respect to the variable democracy at reasonable values of the agricultural rate. 
Specifically, these values are the mean of our sample (38.32), one standard deviation below the mean 
(23.22) and two standard deviations above the mean (68.52). The lower value corresponds to countries 
like the UK, the mean value of 38.32 captures cases like Norway, where the agricultural sector is at 
the margins to be the most crowded segment of the society, and finally the value 68.34 is close to cases 
like Finland or Italy. What we observe in panel B of Table 5 is that when the agricultural sector 
dominates the economy, as in the case of Greece, the size of the public sector remains unaffected after 
democratisation, whereas the composition of tax revenues changes in favour of indirect forms of 
taxation. At the mean of our sample, democratisation still has no effect on the size of the public sector, 
but the composition of tax revenues changes now in favour of direct forms of taxation. Finally, at lower 
values of the agricultural rate, democratisation has a positive effect on the size of the public sector, 
and on direct forms of taxation. To explore more thoroughly the conditional effect of democracy on 
the structure of taxation, Figure 3 plots how the regime change affects the variable direct/indirect at 
different values of the agricultural rate. As shown, consistent to our theoretical priors in Proposition 
2, in the first half the relationship that the agricultural sector dominates the economy the negative effect 
of democracy on the share of direct to indirect taxes is stronger for higher values of the agricultural 
rate. Beyond our model, in the second half of the diagram, where home production is reduced 
significantly and the capability of the state to impose more efficient forms of direct taxation rises, the 
effect on direct/indirect taxes becomes positive and statistically significant in the spirit of the Meltzer 
and Richard (1981) model.  
  
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
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In Table C5 in Appendix C we report some additional robustness checks. First, panel A 
provides estimates of the long-run effect of democratisation using an ECM. Second, we rerun the 
estimates from Table 5 including additional control variables that have been proposed by the relevant 
literature (see, e.g., Aidt and Jensen, 2006; Aidt and Jensen, 2009b). Third, we re-estimate our baseline 
specification by the SURE model. Finally, we apply the Tobit estimator, since four of our dependent 
variables- direct/indirect, urban taxes, rural taxes and market taxes - are coded zero for some years of 
our sample.  In all cases, our results are in line with those reported in Table 5. For instance, the turning 
point for a positive effect of democracy on direct/indirect taxation is agricultural rate below 44 
percent, whereas in Table C5 this value is very close ranging between 42.2 and 47 percent. Overall, 
these results are consistent with our hypothesis that the impact of franchise extension on the tax 
structure is conditional on the phase of economic development. 
 
6. Discussion 
A large number of scholars suggest that the main concern of the Greek governments during the first 
decades after independence was the legitimization of their authority (see e.g., Dertilis, 2015; Kostis, 
2018). This could be achieved by ensuring a minimum level of social cohesion and by convincing the 
citizens of the newly established Greek state that public demand for equality is going to be satisfied. 
On this basis, a number of political and economic benefits were provided to low income agents from 
the very first day after Independence. However, after the constitution of 1864 that transformed the 
political regime to a crowned democracy with universal male suffrage a series of even more radical 
economic reforms took place.  
 According to Dertilis (2015, pp.769-772), the franchise reform of 1864 was accompanied by 
three fundamental economic reforms, all of which were in favour of the rural population. The first one 
was the distribution of the so-called Public Lands (lands that belonged to Ottoman landowners and 
nationalized by the Greek State after Independence) to small peasants and landless sharecroppers in 
1871. This reform was accompanied by a second land redistribution in 1924 of the large-land estates 
that were located mostly in Thessaly. The second reform was related to changes that took place during 
the 1860s in the banking system and allowed rural population to gain access to low-cost credit from 
the banks. This low-cost credit was further increased after 1928 through the creation of the Agricultural 
Bank of Greece. Finally, the third radical economic reform was the restructuring of the tax system. As 
we have already noted, the tax burden on land (i.e., dekati and epikarpia) started to decline in 1845 
and was then reduced more radically after 1864. The significant reduction in rural taxes was 
accompanied by remarkable increases in indirect taxes.  
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 This paper places the spotlight on the third fundamental economic reform and investigates 
empirically whether the extension of voting franchise to all males above the age of 21, that took place 
in 1864, was the ultimate driving force behind the shift in the implemented tax policy. Building on a 
unique tax dataset that contains 13 different tax categories of Greek state during the period 1833-1933, 
our empirical analysis suggests that the Greek governments changed the structure of taxation in order 
to meet the preferences of the electorate, which mainly constituted of peasants and farmers. This new 
political majority was obviously harmed significantly by taxes on land but -at the same time- it was 
able to escape indirect taxes through self-consumption. In turn, our analysis employs a sample of 12 
Western European countries over the same period and provides evidence that the phase of economic 
development induced a differentiated effect of democratisation on the size and the structure of taxation 
also in Europe. 
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Table 1. Tax revenues of the Greek state over 1833-1933 
 
total taxes direct/indirect rural taxes urban taxes custom taxes market taxes 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
time range:       
1833-1844 14.98 2.13 65.87 1.74 24.54 7.85 
1845-1864 11.29 1.48 56.69 2.33 27.21 13.77 
1865-1879 10.89 0.78 38.51 5.04 41.19 15.26 
1880-1915 13.99 0.31 16.77 6.76 38.83 37.64 
1916-1933 17.70 0.41 9.74 18.66 32.63 38.97 
Notes: Column titles refer to the tax variables as defined in Section 2.1; time range indicates the five sub-periods we split 
our sample. Rural taxes, urban taxes, custom taxes and market taxes are all expressed as a percentage of total taxes and 
therefore the summation of columns (3)-(6) always equals to 100.  
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Table 2. Fiscal effects of democratisation in Greece 
 total taxes direct/indirect rural taxes urban taxes customs taxes market taxes 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
democracy 0.181 -0.138*** -5.138*** -1.491 5.729*** 1.405 
 (0.652) (0.050) (1.667) (1.039) (1.698) (1.106) 
lagged dependent variable 0.821*** 0.476*** 0.423*** 0.805*** 0.606*** 0.917*** 
 (0.068) (0.098) (0.108) (0.117) (0.078) (0.044) 
GDP per capita -0.188 0.464 3.809 0.156 -4.266 2.929 
 (1.455) (0.287) (3.878) (1.262) (3.323) (2.089) 
agricultural rate -0.150 -0.024 -0.087 0.032 0.297 -0.213 
 (0.154) (0.017) (0.374) (0.227) (0.368) (0.219) 
old 0.466 0.121 1.069 1.090** 0.392 -0.851 
 (0.472) (0.078) (1.078) (0.456) (0.931) (0.655) 
population spikes -0.537 -0.023 -1.036 -1.304 3.186 -0.511 
 (0.638) (0.048) (0.970) (1.599) (2.848) (1.424) 
debt crisis -0.968* 0.023 3.051*** -0.411 -0.174 -0.484 
 (0.555) (0.039) (1.033) (0.363) (1.117) (0.837) 
currency crisis -0.014 -0.201*** -2.469* -7.839*** 6.466** 4.221*** 
 (0.737) (0.041) (1.448) (2.718) (2.619) (1.318) 
internal instability -2.918*** -0.070 0.315 -1.591 -0.364 2.819* 
 (0.812) (0.060) (1.261) (0.958) (1.884) (1.493) 
wars -0.268 0.026 0.324 0.875 -1.689 -0.102 
 (0.551) (0.045) (1.354) (0.622) (1.427) (0.896) 
Observations 100 100 100 100 100 100 
R2 0.897 0.921 0.976 0.926 0.789 0.975 
Notes: Column titles refer to the dependent variable. The table reports OLS estimates of equation (19). All estimates include an intercept 
and a time trend, but these coefficients are not reported to save space. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** denotes 
significance at 1% level, ** denotes significance at 5% level and * denotes significance at 10% level. 
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Table 3. Fiscal effects of democratisation in Greece: Robustness checks 
 total taxes direct/indirect  rural taxes urban taxes customs taxes market taxes 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Panel A: Restricting the set of covariates   
 
 
 
democracy 0.725 -0.093* -3.748** 1.046 4.866** -0.060 
 
(0.756) (0.053) (1.559) (0.842) (1.870) (1.121) 
Observations  100 100 100 100 100 100 
R2 0.870 0.918 0.974 0.886 0.763 0.971 
       
Panel B: Sample 1845-1915     
       
democracy -1.363 -0.295*** -10.603*** 0.133 9.421** 3.472 
 
(1.090) (0.105) (2.795) (0.325) (4.204) (2.780) 
Observations  71 71 71 71 71 71 
R2 0.755 0.899 0.964 0.947 0.780 0.973 
 
      
Panel C: Sample 1853-1879      
 
      
democracy 2.083 -0.368 -12.227* 0.111 13.838*** -0.059 
 
(1.665) (0.255) (7.265) (0.402) (4.391) (1.369) 
Observations  27 27 27 27 27 27 
R2 0.445 0.876 0.918 0.948 0.935 0.710 
Notes: Column titles refer to the dependent variable. Panel A reports OLS estimates of equation (19) after restricting the set of controls. Panels B 
and C report OLS estimates of equation (19) for the subsamples 1844-1915 and 1853-1879, respectively. In Panel B we control for the lagged 
dependent variable, GDP per capita, agricultural rate, old, population spikes, debt crisis, currency crisis, internal insta bility, wars, an intercept 
and a time trend. Panels A and C exclude from this set the variables debt crisis, currency crisis, internal instability, wars. Additional covariates 
are not reported to save space. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** denotes significance at 1% level, ** denotes significance at 
5% level and * denotes significance at 10% level. 
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Table 4: Estimated changes on rural taxes capita between 1853-1879, after the reform of 1864 
Dependent variable: rural taxes indirect taxes rural taxes 
³DJULFXOWXUDOUDWH´YDULDEOH farmers and peasants 1861 landowners 1861 workers 1861 farmers and peasants 1861 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) ݀݁݉݋ܿݎܽܿݕ כ ܽ݃ݎ݅ܿݑ݈ݐݑݎ݈ܽݎܽݐ݁ -0.198*** -0.151*** -0.078*   0.005 0.129 -0.005 0.376** 
 (0.033) (0.035) (0.039)   (0.090) (0.146) (0.010) (0.153) ଵ଼ܶ଺ହǡଵ଼଺଼ כ ܽ݃ݎ݅ܿݑ݈ݐݑݎ݈ܽݎܽݐ݁    -0.093***      
    (0.031)      ଵ଼ܶ଺ଽǡଵ଼଻ଶ כ ܽ݃ݎ݅ܿݑ݈ݐݑݎ݈ܽݎܽݐ݁    -0.072*      
    (0.045)      ଵ଼ܶ଻ଷǡଵ଼଻଺ כ ܽ݃ݎ݅ܿݑ݈ݐݑݎ݈ܽݎܽݐ݁    -0.050      
    (0.049)      ଵ଼ܶ଻଻ǡଵ଼଻ଽ כ ܽ݃ݎ݅ܿݑ݈ݐݑݎ݈ܽݎܽݐ݁    -0.097*      
    (0.060)      ݐݎ݁݊݀     -0.265***     
     (0.060)     ݐݎ݁݊݀ כ ܽ݃ݎ݅ܿݑ݈ݐݑݎ݈ܽݎܽݐ݁     -0.002     
     (0.003)     ݀݁݉݋ܿݎܽܿݕ כ ݒ݋ݐ݁ݎݐݑݎ݊݋ݑݐ         0.062* 
         (0.032) ݀݁݉݋ܿݎܽܿݕ כ ܽ݃ݎ݅ܿݑ݈ݐݑݎ݈ܽݎܽݐ݁ כ ݒ݋ݐ݁ݎݐݑݎ݊݋ݑݐ         -0.007*** 
         (0.002) 
Province FE 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
Year FE 9 9 9 9  9 9 9 9 
Regional time trends   9 9 9  9 9 9 9 
Controls ሺ ௜ܺ௧ሻ   9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
R2 0.590 0.637 0.697 0.699 0.570 0.691 0.692 0.296 0.707 
Observations 1075 1075 1075 1075 387 1075 1075 1075 1075 
Notes: Columns (1)-(3) list the DD coefficient estimate of equation (20). Column (4) list the DD coefficients estimates of equation (21). Column (5) list selected results from equation (22), a pre-suffrage model of 
rural taxes and agricultural rate. Columns (6) and (7) list the DD coefficient estimate of equation (20) when the ³DJULFXOWXUDOrate´ variable farmers and peasants 1861 is replaced with the variables landowners 
1861 and workers 1861, respectively. Column (8) list the DD coefficient estimate of equation (20), when the dependent variable is indirect taxes instead of rural taxes. Column (9) list the main results of the DDD 
empirical specification of equation (23). Controls include population, population squared, population density and the percentage of delayed payments of the tax instrument. Standard errors clustered at the province-
level are provided in parentheses. *** denotes significance at 1% level, ** denotes significance at 5% level and * denotes significance at 10% level. 
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Table 5. Fiscal effects of democratisation in Europe 
Panel A: Estimated coefficients total taxes direct/indirect  rural taxes urban taxes customs taxes market taxes 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
democracy 0.789*** 0.533*** 0.093 6.358*** -2.554*** -2.226* 
 (0.187) (0.148) (0.390) (1.273) (0.578) (1.106) 
democracy* agricultural rate -0.018*** -0.012*** -0.008 -0.104*** 0.053*** 0.036 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.013) (0.025) (0.015) (0.026) 
agricultural rate 0.018 0.019** 0.053 0.186** -0.142*** -0.059 
 (0.014) (0.007) (0.043) (0.061) (0.045) (0.047) 
lagged dependent variable 0.769*** 0.228 0.913*** 0.717*** 0.837*** 0.768*** 
 (0.055) (0.186) (0.031) (0.063) (0.037) (0.064) 
GDP per capita -2.983*** 0.010 1.129 -0.089 -10.806*** 11.188*** 
 (0.821) (0.209) (1.528) (2.210) (2.604) (2.641) 
old 0.516*** -0.012 -0.103 0.164 -0.077 0.803 
 (0.118) (0.030) (0.169) (0.399) (0.358) (0.496) 
population  2.730* -0.209 -2.037** 1.976 0.341 5.464 
 (1.409) (0.209) (0.831) (1.918) (3.740) (3.161) 
debt crisis -0.267 0.195* 0.176 0.093 -3.020 2.726 
 (0.175) (0.102) (0.433) (1.664) (2.183) (2.727) 
currency crisis -0.021 0.005 -1.386 1.693 -1.971* 1.367 
 (0.306) (0.133) (1.369) (1.435) (0.987) (1.343) 
internal instability 0.221 -0.416 -1.960*** -4.547 -2.418* 0.716** 
 (0.352) (0.402) (0.315) (3.666) (1.129) (0.301) 
wars 0.239** -0.016 0.177 -0.125 -0.682 0.928* 
 (0.080) (0.032) (0.115) (0.449) (0.394) (0.446) 
Observations 413 654 657 660 654 654 
R2 0.939 0.807 0.959 0.937 0.941 0.838 
Panel B: Estimated fiscal effects of democracy for different values of the agricultural rate   
agricultural rate = 23.22 0.373* 0.261*** -0.103 3.934*** -1.331*** -1.394** 
 (0.176) (0.078) (0.182) (0.882) (0.314) (0.614) 
agricultural rate = 38.32 (mean) 0.102 0.083* -0.231 2.357*** -0.536* -0.852* 
 (0.211) (0.045) (0.226) (0.752) (0.281) (0.460) 
agricultural rate = 68.52 -0.440 -0.271** -0.486 -0.797 1.054 0.231 
 
(0.334) (0.096) (0.563) (0.993) (0.605) (0.912) 
Notes: Panel A reports OLS estimates of equation (24). All estimates include a full set of country and year fixed effects. Robust standard 
errors, clustered by country are reported in parentheses. Panel B reports estimates of the derivative of the variable agriculture rate with respect 
to the variable democracy with controls set at the mean. *** denotes significance at 1% level, ** denotes significance at 5% level and * 
denotes significance at 10% level. 
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Figure 1. Tax revenues of the Greek state over 1833-1933 
 
Notes: The graph shows the evolution of the level and composition of taxation in the Greek state over the period 1833-
1933. The red dashed line indicates the year of the radical enfranchisement reform of 1864.  
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Figure 2. Workforce in Agriculture (%): Greece vs Europe upon democratisation 
 
Notes: In the parenthesis, next to the country name, the year democratisation is reported. Source, Boix et al. (2013). For Greece, the 
variable workforce in agriculture (%) is obtained by Dertilis (1993). For all other European countries from Banks and Wilson (2015).  
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Figure 3. Conditional effect of democracy on direct/indirect (taxation) 
Notes: This graph shows the conditional effects of democracy on the change in the share of direct/indirect taxation at different 
values of the agricultural rate; The conditional effects are calculated based on the specification (2) of Table 5; All other 
covariates are held constant at their means; Dashed lines signify 90% confidence intervals; Rug plot at horizontal axis illustrates 
distribution of agricultural rate in the sample; Red horizontal line marks marginal effect of 0. 
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Appendix A. Tax Data for Greece 
A1. National tax database 
Dertilis (1993, pp.105-297) was the first who attempted the development of a detailed historical tax 
database for Greece. After 10 years of personal research, he managed to track 89 fiscal accounts of the 
Greek state for the period 1833-1933. His research concluded with 12 missing accounts for the following 
years: 1850, 1851, 1856, 1857, 1863, 1907, and 1914-1919. Moreover, it should be noted that for the years 
1845-1849, 1860, and 1867, Dertilis (1993, pp.105-297) employed data from provisional fiscal accounts 
(i.e., Genikoi Logarismoi), instead of final fiscal accounts (i.e., Apologismoi) of the Greek state, since the 
latter were missing.  
In a subsequent period, Prontzas et al. (2011) managed to track all the remaining final fiscal 
accounts of the Greek state for the period under consideration, except for the year 1860. We tracked down 
the account for that year in the HANBG, were we also obtained regional fiscal statistics for the fiscal years 
1853-1879. The newly tracked final fiscal accounts, were merged with those from the database of Dertilis 
(1993), who based on the methodology of Flora et al. (1983) divided taxes into 13 broad tax categories: 
(1) land tax, (2) assessed tax, (3) trade tax, (4) corporation tax, (5) income tax, (6) property tax, (7) 
inheritance tax, (8) extraordinary tax, (9) other direct tax, (10) customs tax, (11) excise tax, (12) turnover 
tax, and (13) other indirect tax. For more details about the classification of different types of taxes into the 
13 broad tax categories, see Dertilis (1993), pp. 189-203. 
 
A2. A brief history of the evolution of taxation in Greece 
Following the successful revolution against the Ottoman rule between 1821-1829, Greece won its 
independence in 1830. After the war the tax system of the new-born Greek state was modified, but some 
basic characteristics remained similar to those established by the Ottoman empire (see e.g., Shaw, 1975; 
McGowan, 1981).38 The most basic component of rural taxation, the so-called dekati, which was a 10 
percent tax on gross agricultural and livestock production, remained untouched. However, for specific 
types of agricultural goods (such as cotton, tobacco, and vines) Greek governments replaced dekati with 
the so-called stremmatiki forologia, which was based on the extent of the cultivated land (see Dertilis, 
1993; Petmezas, 2003). On top of dekati, an additional 15 percent of the gross production was going to 
rents if the land was granted by the Greek state (the so-called epikarpia).39 Moreover, if public lands were 
used without the permission of the Greek state, peasants were obliged to pay an additional 15 percent of 
                                                             
38
 For instance, a large number of Ottoman lump sum taxes on peasants and farmers (such as ispence and avariz) were abolished. 
39
 After independence, in practice, Greek authorities nationalized the great bulk of lands that belonged to Ottoman landowners. More precisely, 
although the Treaty of Constantinople had protected the land property rights of Ottoman individuals and institutions, in practice, Greek 
governments tolerated transactions and practices that were detrimental to these rights. Eventually, Greek authorities nationalized these lands 
as a temporary measure, but it took almost half century since independence before the official distribution of lands to the peasantry in 1871.  
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their gross production as epikarpia. Thus, the overall tax burden of the peasantry was ranging roughly 
between 25 to 40 percent. After the adoption of the constitution in 1844, a new tax law was voted in 1845. 
According to the new legislation, land rent paid for public lands (epikarpia) was reduced to a level of 10 
percent, irrespective of whether public lands were used with or without permission. Therefore, the overall 
tax burden on land was decreased to a maximum of 20 percent of gross production. For this reason, as can 
be seen in Table 1, total taxes are reduced, whereas the percentage of rural taxes also drop from 65.87 
percent the period 1833-1844, to 56.7 the years after the reform- and before the new constitution of 1864 
was voted in.  
After 1864, the tax rates of dekati and stremmatiki forologia fall significantly. It must be noted that 
during the same period there were also significant efforts from the Greek governments to fully abolish 
dekati, which finally took place in 1880.40 Following similar political rationale, from 1880 until the first 
two decades of the 20th century, most of the Greek governments implemented tax reforms that were based 
on reductions of several direct taxes paid by the agricultural population (see e.g., Sideris, 1931), decreasing 
dramatically the level of rural taxation below 17 percent of total taxation. 
The changes that took place between 1843 and 1880 were accompanied by remarkable increases in 
indirect taxes. Until 1884, most of these indirect taxes were basically custom duties on imported goods 
and other indirect taxes (e.g., stamp duty on legal documents). Then, in 1884, Prime Minister Charilaos 
Trikoupis implemented a tax reform that introduced a large number of excises duties - first introduced in 
1880 - increasing at the same time revenues from state monopolies (see Kostis, 2006). As can be easily 
verified in columns (5) and (6) of Table 1, the summation of custom taxes and market taxes increased 
significantly in the years after the first big political reform in 1844, and even more rapidly after 1864. 
Changes in rural taxes and indirect taxation are also reflected on the evolution of the ratio direct to indirect 
taxes that decreases constantly during the whole period (see column (2) of Table 1). 
Another basic characteristic of the Greek tax system was the full absence of personal income taxation 
until 1910. Investigating the composition of direct taxes from 1833 to 1910, several scholars have 
concluded that the amazing drop in rural taxes was accompanied by moderate increases, or introduction, 
of other forms of direct taxation that fell within the categories of trade or corporate taxation (see e.g., 
Dertilis, 1993). A good example is the introduction of the corporate tax rate in 1877, which contributed, 
on average, less than 0.5 percent of annual tax revenues. In 1911, Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos 
introduced the first modern personal income tax. However, its tax rate was flat and small and tax evasion 
so large that tax revenues from personal income taxation were insignificant until 1918. Its share exceeded 
                                                             
40
 In 1860, Koumoundouros, the minister of finance of the Greek state, proposed a tax law, according to which dekati would be fully replaced 
by stremmatiki forologia. A similar reform was proposed by Sotiropoulos, a subsequent finance minister, in 1867. Both tax laws failed to 
become laws of the Greek state (see Sideris, 1931), since they were blocked mainly by the politically powerful group of tax farmers who 
were responsible for the monitoring and in some periods the collection of rural taxes (Kostis, 2006).  
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5 percent in 1919, and increased gradually thereafter. This is one of the reasons that urban taxes increased 
from 6.76 percent during the period of 1864-1915 to 18.66 percent on average the remaining years of our 
sample. As already mentioned, another important reason was the increase in extraordinary and other direct 
taxes due to the involvement of Greece in two wars between 1916-1933. This change also affected the 
overall level of total taxes that increased on average by almost by 4 percent of GDP after 1916 relative to 
the period 1880-1915.  
 
A3. Collection of rural taxes between 1853-1879 
For each category of rural taxes the central government was budgeting the amount of taxes expected by 
each municipality. This amount was determined by the production capability of each municipality the tax 
rates set by the state, but also, and more importantly for our study, by the willingness of the state to collect 
taxes consistently within the Greek territory. The land tax in the Kingdom of Greece during 1853-1879 
was collected in three different ways. The first and most important way of collecting the vast majority of 
the land tax (i.e., dekati and epikarpia), was through outsourcing its imposition and monitoring to private 
agents. According to this practice, rich members of notables were competing in public auctions - organised 
by the local authorities of each municipality in the capital city of the province - to impose and monitor the 
collection of expected taxes by the local population. Specifically, the winner had the right to impose tax 
burdens set by the state, subject to the production capability of each producer, and verify that taxpayers 
submit the agreed payment on time in the public cashier of the municipality. 7KHSURILWRIWKH³WD[IDUPHU´
from this process was to keep the residual tax revenues collected -above the determined tax receivables at 
the auction.41 TKH³WD[UHQWHU´ZDVQRWDOORZHGWRFROOHFWUHYHQXHV LQFDVKRU LQ-kind directly from the 
taxpayer. Only after the agreed amount of taxes was gathered in the public cashier the authorities were 
compensatiQJWKH³WD[UHQWHU´ZLWKWKHUHVLGXDOWD[FROOHFWLRQV42 Second, for some agricultural products 
(e.g., tobacco) taxes were levied according to the extent of the cultivated land (i.e., stremmatiki forologia). 
In particular, the producer had the duty to declare in the mayor the extent of his cultivated land. After that, 
employees of the local government had to verify the accuracy of this declaration, and inform the producer 
for the tax payment according to the tax rates set by the state. Third, for specific types of agricultural goods 
that were exported to international markets (mainly currants), it was collected in custom houses around 
                                                             
41
 7KLVLVDYDULDWLRQRIWKHVRFDOOHG³WD[IDUPLQJ´DWD[FROOHFWLRQVFKHPHWKDWZDVDJOREDOSKHQRPHQRQXQWLOWKHWKFHQWXry, due to the 
absence of a fully developed tax bureaucracy (see, Webber and Wildavsky 1986). It can be tracked back in Ancient Greece and the Roman 
Republic and Empire (see, Adams, 1999). It reappeared in Byzantium and was reborn in many European countries such as England and 
France in the Middle Ages as the dominant tax collection method (see, e.g., White, 2004; Johnson and Koyama, 2014). Tax farmers were 
financial intermediary for governments in the Ottoman Empire (see, Cizakca 1993; Salzmann 1993), an institution inherited to the modern 
Greek state after its independence.  
42
 The last two years of our sample a new law compelled the participants to submit an initial advance deposit after the auction followed by 
two more instalments during the fiscal year to cover the agreed payment. Tax farmers though had the right to collect the physical tax revenues 
and in turn to merchandise them with the aim of making a profit. This is the rental contract for a tax farm, under which the tax collectors 
would pay a fixed rent to the government for the right to collect a tax and keep the remaining revenue (see, e.g., Azabou and Nugent 1988; 
Stella 1993).  
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Greece -not in the public cashier of each province. This component of the land tax (~10 percent) cannot 
be included in the regional empirical analysis, since custom receipts of exported agricultural goods are 
reported only at the national level. The system of collection of assessed taxes on livestock production (the 
second component of rural taxes) is similar to the second method of collection of the land tax (i.e., 
stremmatiki forologia) meaning that local authorities were responsible to impose the tax burdens of the 
state to livestock production, and monitor the tax collection process.43  
 
  
                                                             
43
 The authorities were publishing every year in the Government Gazzete, among others, laws about the tax policy (e.g., changes in tax rates) 
and the rules for the collection of taxes. With respect to the land tax important information for its collection can be found on issues published 
on April 25, 1848 (vol. 13), April 15, 1855 (vol. 13), June 26, 1863 (vol. 24) and January 3, 1878 (vol. 1) all available in the following link: 
http://www.et.gr/index.php/anazitisi-fek  
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Appendix B: The solution of the model and comparative statics 
Proposition 1. For given levels of g, a decrease in the median productivity me  of the electorate, increases 
Cq and decreases Hq . Therefore, the extension of the voting franchise to the poorer segments of the 
population -that implies a lower level of me
 
for those with the right to vote- exerts a negative impact on 
the share of direct to indirect taxes ( H
C
q
q
).  
 
Proof 
Agents have intermediate preferences and consequently a Condorcet winner always exists and is given by 
the bliss point of the median voter (i.e., the agent with the median productivity em) (see e.g., Grandmont, 
1978 for more details on this). The indirect utility function of the median voter is as follows: 
 
( , ) ( ) ( , )+ ( ( )) (1 ) ( ( , ))
1
m M
C H m M C H C H H C H
C
AW q q e e A L q q V X q q A H q q
q
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So, the political equilibrium is given by the following equation:   
 
2
( ) ( , ) ( ) ( , )(1 ) 0(1 )
m
M m C H C C H
M H C
C C C C C
A e e L q q X q H q qW VA A q
q q q X q q
T T T  w w ww w      w  w w w w
  
(A.1) 
( , ) ( , )(1 ) ( , ) (1 ) 0
m
C H C H
M H C H H H
H H H
L q q H q qW A A H q q q A
q q q
T T Tw ww       w w w      (A.2) 
 
More precisely, equations (A.1), (A.2) determine -for given level of g- the consumption tax ( Cq ) and the 
home production tax ( Hq ) as functions of median productivity ( me ), mean productivity ( e ) and the 
parameter values T , MA and HA . 
 
Subtracting (A.2) from (A.1) we can define ( , , )C H mF q q e  as follows: 
2
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In turn, by employing the implicit function theorem it can be established that the effect of median 
productivity on consumption tax ( Cq ) is as follows:  
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It can be easily verified that (A.3) is negative for any typical right skewed productivity distribution (i.e. 
for 
me e ).   
 
Similarly, the effect of median productivity on home production tax ( Hq ) is as follows: 
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Obviously (A.4) is always positive. Combining the above mentioned results we conclude that a decrease 
in the median productivity me increases consumption tax ( Cq ) and decreases home production tax ( Hq ) 
and so exerts a clear cut negative impact on the share of direct to indirect taxes ( H
C
q
q
). 
Proposition 2. The positive effect of changing median productivity me  on the share of direct to indirect 
taxes ( H
C
q
q
) is conditional on the size of ș (i.e., the level of economic development). In particular, for lower 
values of ș the positive effect of changing median productivity on the share of direct to indirect taxes is 
stronger. 
 
Proof  
Equation (A.3) suggests that the effect of changing median productivity em on consumption tax ( Cq ) is 
negative -for any typical right skewed productivity distribution- and independent of the level of economic 
development (i.e. the level of ș). On the other hand, equation (A.4) suggests that the effect of changing 
median productivity on home production tax ( Hq ) is always positive but dependent on the level of 
economic development (i.e. the level of ș). More precisely, by taking the second order derivative with 
respect to ș we get: 
 
 2
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It can be easily verified that (A.5) is positive when 1 2T T   (and negative when 1/ 2 1T   ).  
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So, the positive effect of changing median productivity em on home production tax ( Hq ) is stronger for 
lower values of ș and becomes weaker as ș increases.  Since, on the other hand, the negative effect of 
changing median productivity em on consumption tax ( Cq ) does not depend on ș, we can easily conclude 
that the positive effect of changing median productivity on the share of direct to indirect taxes ( H
C
q
q
) is 
stronger for lower values of ș and becomes weaker as ș increases.  
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Appendix C. Additional Tables and Figures 
 
Table C1: Summary statistics of Greek national data 
Variable Description Obs. Mean SD Min Max Source 
democracy Dummy variable that takes the value of one whenever the political regime in Greece is 
categorised as democratic, and 0 otherwise 
101 0.574 0.497 0.000 1.000 1 
polity2 Index variable that ranges -10 (extreme autocracy) to +10 (perfect democracy) 101 4.515 6.162 -6.000 10.000 2 
total taxes Total tax revenues as a share of GDP (%) 101 13.773 4.072 5.900 26.743 3 
rural taxes Sum of land and assessed taxes as a share of total tax revenues (%) 101 32.485 21.501 3.035 75.518 4 
urban taxes Sum of income, trade, corporation, property, inheritance, extraordinary and other direct 
taxes as a share of total tax revenues (%) 
101 7.151 6.631 0.000 31.769 4 
customs taxes Customs duties on imported goods as a share of total tax revenues (%) 101 34.078 7.766 17.618 55.150 4 
market taxes Sum of excise, turnover, and other indirect taxes as a share of total tax revenues (%) 101 26.286 13.895 2.495 47.000 4 
direct/indirect  Ratio of direct taxes -rural and urban taxes- to indirect taxes -customs and market taxes.  101 0.846 0.680 0.204 3.085 4 
GDP per capita Log of GDP per capita 101 5.435 0.164 5.040 5.847 5 
agricultural rate Population within Greece living in cities of less than two thousand people (%) 101 70.440 6.301 56.500 80.000 6 
old Population over the age 
of 65 as a share of total population 
(%). 
101 3.919 0.918 3.058 5.905 7 
population 
spikes 
Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 in the years 1864, 1881, 1913, 1920 and 1922, 
and 0 otherwise. 
101 0.050 0.218 0.000 1.000 Own 
calculations 
debt crisis Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 the years 1833-1878, 1894-1897 and 1932-
1933, and 0 otherwise. 
101 0.515 0.502 0.000 1.000 8 
currency crisis Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 the years 1919-1921, 1924 and 1931, and 0 
otherwise. 
101 0.050 0.218 0.000 1.000 8 
internal 
instability 
Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 the years 1843, 1862, 1909 and 1916-1917, and 
0 otherwise.  
101 0.050 0.218 0.000 1.000 Own 
calculations 
wars Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 during the years 1866-1869, 1878, 1897, 1912-
1913 and 1917-1922, and 0 otherwise. 
101 0.139 0.347 0.000 1.000 Own 
calculations 
Source:  
1. Boix et al. (2013) 
2. Marshall and Jaggers (2010) 
3. Own calculations based on fiscal data retrieved from Dertilis (1993), Prontzas et al. (2011) and Historical Archives of the National Bank of Greece (DPH). GDP data are taken from and Kostelenos et al. 
(2007) 
4. Own calculations based on fiscal data retrieved from DPH 
5. Kostelenos et al. (2007) 
6. Dertilis (1993) 
7. Siampos (1973) 
8. Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) 
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Table C2: Summary statistics of Greek regional data 
Variable Description Obs. Mean SD Min Max Source 
democracy Dummy variable that takes the value of one after 1865, and 0 otherwise 1075 0.600 0.490 0.000 1.000 1 
rural taxes Sum of land and assessed taxes, expressed in real per capital terms 1075 6.134 4.627 0.000 29.681 2 
indirect taxes Stamp duties, and various other rights, expressed in real per capita terms 1075 1.571 1.370 0.000 11.724 2 
rural taxes delays Rural taxes delays as a percentage of rural taxes receivables 1075 13.109 11.893 0.000 74.592 3 
indirect taxes delays Indirect taxes delays as a percentage of indirect taxes receivables 1075 1.761 4.174 -0.190 89.264 3 
farmers and peasants 1861 Farmers and peasants as a percentage of the total province population in 
1861  
1075 17.078 6.879 2.837 28.426 4 
landowners 1861 Landowners as a percentage of the total province population in 1861 1075 1.564 1.852 0.112 11.476 4 
workers 1861 Workers as a percentage of the total province population in 1861 1075 1.766 1.693 0.000 7.478 4 
voter turnout Voters as a percentage of the enfranchised in 1879 1075 65.724 13.288 31.000 88.000 4 
population (in thousands) Total province population for the years 1853, 1861, 1870 and 1879. We 
obtain the remaining years by linear interpolation 
1075 27716.9 15220.3 8377.0 1.23e+05 4 
population density Total province population per unit of province area.  1075 30.769 21.985 8.669 149.777 4 
Source:  
1. Boix et al. (2013) 
2. Own calculations based on fiscal data retrieved from the Historical Archives of the National Bank of Greece (HANBG), and census data from the Hellenic Statistical 
Association (HSA). To express the variable real terms we use data for changes in the price level from Lazaretou (2014). 
3. Own calculations based on fiscal data retrieved from the Historical Archives of the National Bank of Greece (HANBG) 
4. Own calculations based on census data obtained from Hellenic Statistical Authority (HSA) 
55 
 
Table C3: Summary statistics of European sample 
Variable Description Obs. Mean SD Min Max Source 
democracy Dummy variable that equals to one whenever a political regime is characterized as democratic and 0 
otherwise 
670 0.485 0.500 0.000 1.000 1 
total taxes Total tax revenues as a percentage of GDP 425 7.284 3.713 1.300 20.500 2 
rural taxes Sum of land and assessed taxes as a percentage of total tax revenues 668 9.032 9.605 0.000 33.800 2 
urban taxes Sum of income, trade, corporation, property, inheritance, extraordinary and other direct taxes as a 
percentage of total tax revenues 
670 18.641 14.803 0.000 73.500 2 
customs taxes Customs taxes as a percentage  of total tax revenues 670 30.859 23.915 4.200 96.400 2 
market taxes Sum of excise, turnover, and other indirect taxes as a percentage of total tax revenues 670 41.479 16.060 0.000 73.900 2 
direct/indirect Ratio of direct taxes -rural and urban taxes- to indirect taxes -customs and market taxes.  670 0.452 0.362 0.000 2.774 2 
GDP per capita Log of GDP per capita 670 7.935 0.363 6.997 8.753 3 
agricultural rate Percentage of workforce occupied in agriculture 670 38.318 15.101 5.700 69.300 4 
old Population over the age 
of 65 as a percentage of total population 
670 6.392 1.255 3.465 9.745 5 
population  Log of population 670 9.247 1.161 7.512 11.098 3 
debt crisis Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a debt (domestic or external) crisis occurred during the year, 
and 0 otherwise 
670 0.009 0.094 0.000 1.000 6 
currency crisis Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a currency crisis occurred during the year, and 0 otherwise 670 0.033 0.178 0.000 1.000 6 
internal 
instability 
Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a revolutionary event took place in a given year, and 0 
otherwise 
670 0.052 0.223 0.000 1.000 7 
wars Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a country participated in an armed conflict with another 
country in a given year, and 0 otherwise 
670 0.373 0.484 0.000 1.000 8 
voting system A dummy variable equal to 0 if majority representation is used and equal to 1 if proportional 
representation is used 
660 0.209 0.407 0.000 1.000 9 
left Share of seats won by left-wing parties in elections to the lower chamber of parliament in percentage of 
all seats 
637 10.262 14.666 0.000 55.400 9 
x-polity Polity index without competitiveness of political participation (PARCOMP), and regulation of political 
participation (PARREG) 
670 5.590 1.771 0.000 7.000 10 
Source:  
1. Boix et al. (2013) 
2. Flora et al. (1983) 
3. Bolt and van Zanden (2014) 
4. Banks and Wilson (2015) 
5. Mitcell (2003) 
6. Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) 
7. Aidt and Jensen (2014) 
8. Brecke (1999) 
9. Aidt et al. (2008) 
10. Marshall and Jaggers (2010) 
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Table C4. Fiscal effects of democratisation in Greece: Additional robustness checks 
 total taxes direct/indirect  rural taxes urban taxes customs taxes market taxes 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: ECM ± Long-run effect    
       
democracy -2.503 -0.242** -8.391*** -14.043 13.320*** -2.503 
 
(6.551) (0.110) (2.215) (17.910) (3.693) (6.551) 
Observations  100 100 100 100 100 100 
R2 0.346 0.327 0.388 0.543 0.673 0.645 
 
      
Panel B: Using alternative measure of democracy     
       
polity2 -0.002 -0.011** -0.425*** -0.160 0.410*** 0.161* 
 
(0.057) (0.005) (0.160) (0.118) (0.136) (0.086) 
Observations  100 100 100 100 100 100 
R2 0.897 0.920 0.975 0.926 0.777 0.975 
       
Panel C: Testing for outliers     
       
democracy 0.430 -0.115*** -4.227*** -1.529** 4.745*** 1.121 
 
(0.499) (0.037) (1.514) (0.611) (1.384) (0.871) 
Observations  93 95 96 95 94 94 
R2 0.930 0.970 0.985 0.983 0.854 0.983 
 
      
Panel D: SURE     
 
      
democracy -0.122 -0.121* -3.534*** -1.497* 4.525*** 0.595 
 
(0.618) (0.072) (1.285) (0.814) (1.413) (0.891) 
Observations  100 100 100 100 100 100 
R2 0.896 0.917 0.974 0.925 0.782 0.974 
Notes: Column titles refer to the dependent variable. Panel A reports OLS estimates after transforming equation (19) to an ECM. Panel B 
reports OLS estimates of equation (19) after replacing the variable democracy with the variable polity2. Panel C list coefficient estimates of 
equation (19) after removing observations with standardized residuals above 1.96 or below -1.96. Panel D lists a complete system of SURE 
estimates. All models control for the lagged dependent variable, GDP per capita, agricultural rate, old, population spikes, debt crisis, 
currency crisis, internal instability, wars, an intercept and a time trend, but these coefficients are not reported to save space. Panels A, B and 
C report robust standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes significance at 1% level, ** denotes significance at 5% level and * denotes  
significance at 10% level. 
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Table C5. Fiscal effects of democratisation in Europe: robustness checks 
 total taxes direct/indirect  rural taxes urban taxes customs taxes market taxes 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: ECM ± Long-run effect    
       
democracy 1.701** 0.764*** 4.209 26.049*** -20.495*** -11.151*** 
 (0.704) (0.120) (3.146) (3.963) (3.582) (4.046) 
democracy* agricultural rate -0.043** -0.016*** -0.167* -0.435*** 0.415*** 0.189* 
 (0.018) (0.002) (0.087) (0.082) (0.109) (0.104) 
agricultural rate 0.157*** 0.024*** 0.123 0.900*** -0.791*** -0.256 
 
(0.051) (0.006) (0.119) (0.251) (0.207) (0.204) 
Observations  393 639 639 639 639 639 
R2 0.509 0.489 0.250 0.372 0.254 0.287 
 
      
Panel B: Additional controls          
       
democracy 0.587* 0.252*** 0.074 5.060*** -1.859** -2.408 
 (0.269) (0.062) (0.345) (1.097) (0.682) (1.441) 
democracy* agricultural rate -0.018** -0.006*** -0.006 -0.086*** 0.040* 0.038 
 (0.006) (0.001) (0.011) (0.022) (0.019) (0.030) 
agricultural rate 0.015 0.008*** 0.048 0.165** -0.132** -0.040 
 
(0.012) (0.002) (0.035) (0.064) (0.054) (0.045) 
Observations  386 620 623 626 620 620 
R2 0.943 0.895 0.959 0.944 0.947 0.844 
 
      
Panel C: SURE        
       
democracy 0.755** 0.263*** 0.157 4.041*** -1.073 -3.130*** 
 (0.300) (0.049) (0.333) (1.292) (1.123) (1.183) 
democracy* agricultural rate -0.018** -0.006*** -0.004 -0.082** 0.018 0.072** 
 (0.008) (0.001) (0.009) (0.034) (0.029) (0.031) 
agricultural rate 0.021 0.005** 0.007 0.115* -0.086 -0.047 
 
(0.014) (0.002) (0.016) (0.059) (0.053) (0.055) 
Observations  466 466 466 466 466 466 
R2 0.982 0.939 0.988 0.972 0.985 0.957 
 
      
Panel D: Tobit estimates       
       
democracy 0.789*** 0.526*** 0.467 5.863*** -2.554*** -1.971* 
 (0.166) (0.140) (0.335) (1.320) (0.534) (1.008) 
democracy* agricultural rate -0.018*** -0.011*** -0.016 -0.093*** 0.053*** 0.024 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.013) (0.029) (0.014) (0.028) 
agricultural rate 0.018 0.019*** 0.063 0.195*** -0.142*** -0.065 
 
(0.013) (0.006) (0.058) (0.059) (0.042) (0.042) 
Observations  413 654 657 660 654 654 
Notes: Column titles refer to the dependent variable. Panel A reports OLS estimates after transforming equation (24) to an ECM. In Panel B 
equation (24) is augmented with additional controls: voting system, left and x-polity, but these coefficients are not reported to save space. 
Panel C lists a complete system of SURE estimates. Panel D reports Tobit model regressions of equation (24). All models control for the 
lagged dependent variable, GDP per capita, agricultural rate, old, population, debt crisis, currency crisis, internal instability, wars, but these 
coefficients are not reported to save space. Panels A, B and D report robust standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses. *** denotes 
significance at 1% level, ** denotes significance at 5% level and * denotes significance at 10% level. 
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Figure C1: Ballot box after the reform of 1864 
 
Notes: Images for the ballot box used after the reform of 1864. The ballot box was divided internally into two 
parts in which there were two sacks. As can be seen, the outside of each box was painted half white and half black, 
FRUUHVSRQGLQJWRDSRVLWLYHYRWHLHȃǹǿRUQRYRWHLHȅ&+ǿIRUWKHFDQGLGDWH$WWKe top of the ballot box 
it was stuck a tube angle from top to bottom inside the ballot box, resulting in a round hole. The elector was given 
a lead ball by the attendant (a member of the Election Committee), and approaching the ballot box he had to put 
his hand into the tube dropping the pellet into the desired compartment - i.e., black or white. In each polling station 
there was a number of ballot boxes equal to that of candidates standing for elections in the province.  
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Figure C2: The land tax as reported in the fiscal accounts of the Greek state in 1863 
 
Notes: From the left to the right the Table reports the name of the public cashier (i.e., ȉĮȝİȓĮ), tax receivables 
(i.e., ǼȚıʌȡĮțĲȑĮ), tax receipts (i.e., ǼȚıʌȡĮȤșȑȞĲĮ), and the percentage of delayed payments (i.e., 
ȀĮșȣıĲİȡȠȪȞĲĮ) for the land tax of 1863. Source: HANBG 
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Figure C3: Final tax administrative units of the Kingdom of Greece 
 
Notes: The map shows the final tax administrative units we have in our sample between 1853-1879. Before the union of Ionian Islands in Greece in 1864 (grey colour), Greece was divided in 
48 provinces. However, for two of those (i.e., Aegina, Oitulo) no cashier was established between 1853-1879, whereas in three cases (i.e., Argos, Xirochori, Messini) a cashier was established 
after 1874. In the former case, we assume that taxes are collected in the nearest available cashier that in both cases coincides with the cashier of the capital city of the region. We apply the same 
logic in the latter case, since we merge the new cashiers with those at the shortest distance. Again, for two out of the three new cashiers (i.e., Xirochori, Messini) the merging choice coincides 
with the cashier of the capital city. The Ionian Islands are not part of the sample. 
